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Law’s Laboratory: Developing International Law
on Investment Protection as Common Law
By Frédéric G. Sourgens*
Abstract: This Article posits that international law on investment protection develops
as a common law through adjudication of investor-state disputes. It reviews the three
prevalent theories on the development of international law on investment protection.
These three theories are (a) that investor-state decisions reflect a new customary
international law, (b) that investor-state decisions are a potentially corrupt tool of
corporate usurpation of international law, and (c) that investor-state disputes form
part of a self-contained legal regime. The Article explains that each theory fails
because it superimposes policy preferences not present in investor-state decisions. In
rejecting these theories, this Article argues that investor-state disputes trace a caseby-case common law process rather than conform to any rigid theory. Accordingly,
this Article provides a cogent theory of persuasive precedent in investor-state
arbitration premised upon a common law understanding of persuasive authority in
the U.S. courts. The case-by-case common law approach clarifies the current
problem of substantively inconsistent decisions arising out of investor-state disputes.
Normatively, the decision-making divergence between investor-state tribunals is
preferable to artificial uniformity that the three currently prevalent theories impose
upon investor-state decision-making tribunals and outcomes.

* Associate Professor of Law, Washburn Law School. Tulane University School of Law (JD),
University of York (MA), University of Oslo (cand. mag.), United World College of the Adriatic (IB).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Internationalists frequently decry the “Americanization” of
international law.1 Most similarly disfavor a common law conception of
international law.2 While champions of a common law approach do exist,
they leave the reasons for adoption of a common law approach significantly
under-theorized.3 This Article sets out to correct the near instinctive
resistance to a common law approach to international law. In doing so, it
furnishes a cogent theoretical appraisal of an increasingly important field of
application of international law—the arbitration of claims by foreign
investors against their host states under international treaties.
The unique relevance of the common law approach to contemporary
international law should be readily apparent. A web of international courts
and tribunals currently applies international law to the conduct of states
towards their own nationals, prosecutes offenders of international crimes,
regulates international trade, polices the seas, and protects international
investments.4 The resulting explosion of international law in the form of
judgments, arbitral awards, and tribunal decisions under crisscrossing
treaties has given an unprecedented concreteness to international legal
rights and obligations.
This development evokes parallels to the
institutional design of the common law. In both systems, what is
concretely law (rather than legal principle) is resolved in adjudication of
(hard) cases rather than through legislative action.5
The explosion of adjudication predictably threw international law into
an unprecedented state of disarray. With the growing number of courts and
tribunals, “court-splits” on related legal questions before them increased.

1
See Christos Ravanides, The Internationalization of the American Journal of International Law:
Reality or Chimera? (A Survey), 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 193 (2008); see also MARTI
KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA, THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT
522–32 (2d ed. 2005) (criticizing “law-as-fact” approaches associated with the U.S. common law
approach).
2
See, e.g., Manley O. Hudson, Advisory Opinions of National and International Courts, 37 HARV.
L. REV. 970 (1924); GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, THE INDUCTIVE APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
33 (1965); see also Jörg Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in the Formal Sources of International Law:
Customary International Law and Some of Its Problems, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 523, 545–46 (2004).
3
See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Common Law: The Soft Law of
International Tribunals, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 515, 524–25 (2009) (positing without analysis that “[u]nlike
common law, however, these rules [adopted by international tribunals] lack the binding force of law”);
Jeffrey P. Commission, Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Citation Analysis of a
Developing Jurisprudence, 24 J. INT’L ARB. 129 (2007) (providing a purely descriptive study of
jurisprudence).
4
See, e.g., Gary Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61 DUKE L.J. 775 (2012).
5
For a discussion of the virtues and short-comings of a disputes-based and a legislation-based legal
system, see, for example, Frederik Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883 (2006)
(warning of the potential shortcomings of a case-by-case approach to rule establishment inherent in
U.S. common law).
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Competition between tribunals appears to be on the rise, with some
scholars considering that certain tribunals use their approach to the law as
an outright “marketing tool” to become, for certain questions of
international law, what Delaware has become for corporate law in the
United States.6 As academia grapples with this phenomenon, responses
have varied from apology, dystopia, utopia, and back again. But the
common theme emerging from almost any study is that the multiplication
of narrow, concrete rules in disparate specialized dispute resolution bodies
has created challenging obstacles to any grand theory of international law
to which each concrete rule could be reduced. Competition has led to a
perception of dangerous “fragmentation” of international law into a number
of international laws, plural, each administered wholly independently by
one of the various courts and tribunals.
This fragmentation and the attendant inconsistencies and competition
between different tribunals do not threaten the coherence and cohesion of
international law particularly when viewed from a common law
perspective. This international law development is much like a domestic
phenomenon. Despite the existence of circuit splits and major differences
in approaches to law there nevertheless exists one common law of
contracts, torts, property, etc. In fact, it is these divergences that enliven
the debate about finding better problem solutions in legal academia and the
courts. And it is the cross-fertilization between different branches of the
law that results in the evolution of the common law to respond to new
social and economic realities.7
The problem that emerges thus is one of current theories about
international investment jurisprudence rather than necessarily a problem of
the jurisprudence itself. These theories are that international investment
jurisprudence evidences customary international law, that international
investment jurisprudence should not be consulted as a source of law or
inspiration at all, and that international investment jurisprudence is part of a
self-contained international legal regime. All of these theories seek to
impose a principled uniformity on investor-state arbitration to explain and
(de)legitimize the near instantaneous growth of a body of decisional law
under a network of approximately 3,000 international investment
agreements (IIAs), most of which are bilateral international investment
agreements (BITs). This decisional approach leads current theories to fail
descriptively—each proposed principle cannot be defended in the face of

6
See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing International Law, 97 VA. L. REV. 1573, 1606–12 (2011);
Jacob Katz Cogan, Competition and Control in International Adjudication, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 411, 440–
44 (2008). On the role of the Delaware Chancery as a competitive jurisdiction, see John C. Coffee, Jr.,
The Delaware Court of Chancery: Change, Continuity—And Competition, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
387, 394–404 (2012) (describing the competitive pressure on courts in U.S. corporate litigation).
7
See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 74 (1988).
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treaty, state, or arbitral practice.8 But it also fails normatively because it
cannot support why uniformity along the lines of its chosen principle would
be desirable despite contrary state and arbitral practice.
The resulting problem for these theories reflects a well-known aporia
about general international law posited in critical international legal
theory.9 Existing theories to international investment arbitration overdetermine and under-determine the law by arguing for a specific result
from mutually exclusive premises: either the theory posits that its proposal
is law because it is accepted as such by state parties, or it submits that it is
legal on account of some higher order normative principle which overrules
the potential objection of the states against which it is being marshaled.
Existing theories are caught between “is” and “ought,” giving an
inadequate account of either.
This Article argues that this impasse can be overcome by treating
investor-state arbitration not from the vantage point of an “investment law”
it supposedly creates but from the point of view of the decisional process of
resolving investor-state disputes. This process reveals a remarkably
different picture from any of the theories espoused so far. Counsels engage
the entirety of international and comparative law to frame the international
legal problem the tribunal must resolve. This engagement problematizes
record events as legally relevant facts through the invocation of prior
decisions dealing with factually analogous questions. This problem
conditions the interpretation of legal instruments. Further, the choice of
case law by counsel is not limited to any one subset of international law but
encompasses all of the specialized tribunals. Rather than seeking to
segregate investment protection from general international law, the process
of investor-state arbitration seeks to integrate it within a larger international
legal framework.
The appreciation of the process of decision in investor-state arbitration
evidences that it does not operate deductively as existing theories assert.
Rather, judicial and arbitral decisions reason inductively from legally
relevant facts to the applicable legal rules. To answer the problem of
earlier theories, the common law approach posits that there is simply no
organizing principle to defend. Common law rule establishment occurs in
the absence of such a principle, premised instead upon the problematization
of facts through the lens of any prior international legal decisions. The
previously challenging concreteness of cases consequently creates
coherence within the common law by providing pragmatic prototypes for
problem solution.
Not only does investor-state adopt the inductive logic of the common
8

See, e.g., Timothy Meyer, Codifying Custom, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 995, 1059 (2012).
An aporia denotes a perplexing difficulty falling just short of a paradox. For development of the
aporia, see, for example, David Kennedy, The Turn to Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 251, 275
(1985); KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 1.
9
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law, its use of prior decisions by an international adjudicatory body follows
the same logic as the use of persuasive precedent in U.S. common law. It
treats prior decisions as convincing because of their precision, weight, and
canonicity. The dimension of precision, in particular, explains why
decisions can in fact disagree with lines of cases having apparent superior
weight.
The common law approach further corrects the perception that
jurisprudence is “soft law,” simply on account of being non-binding.10
Such a claim may be substantively accurate, but it seriously misunderstands
the importance of jurisprudence to the decision-making process. Although
each decision is not binding, it would be impossible for tribunals to
exercise their function without recourse to jurisprudence. Jurisprudence
sets the parameters of relevant record facts (as opposed to irrelevant ones)
on the basis of which the legal determination of the case must proceed. By
permitting the tribunal to set the factual parameters of its inquiry,
jurisprudence is instrumental to the inductive process of decision-making.
Jurisprudence is not “soft law” so much as it is a hardwired component of
legal analysis.
This Article is structured as follows. Part II explores existing theories
of international investment law and their respective shortcomings. It
concludes that each of these theories is trapped in a critical knot of
argument from mutually exclusive premises. Part III approaches investorstate arbitration from the point of process. It concludes that investor-state
arbitration is both more integrative of general international law solutions by
borrowing from a wide range of public international law disputes, and more
record determined by comparing principally the facts of these disputes to
record facts proved in the arbitration than the prevalent academic views had
theorized. Part IV reconstructs a theory of investor-state arbitration on the
basis of the process insights in Part III. Part V concludes that a common
law approach to investor-state arbitration overcomes both the descriptive
and normative infirmities of existing approaches to investor-state
arbitration.
II. LIMITATIONS OF EXISTING THEORIES OF PRECEDENT
Investor-state arbitration is fertile ground for the competing theories
addressing the new and expanded role of international law. The extreme
positions are, on the one hand, the exploding web of IIAs and decisions
interpreting them to develop new customary international law,11 and, on the
other hand, the denial that this growth of treaties and decisions could

10
11
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Guzman & Meyer, supra note 3, at 524–26.
See discussion infra Part II.A.
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legitimately expand the scope of international law.12 Between these
extreme positions, some authors advocate that arbitral decisions generate a
specialized regime of international investment law in its own right but do
not have free-standing force of law.13 As discussed in this part, each of
these theoretical approaches is structurally and normatively problematic:
they rest on generalizations champions of each theory themselves call into
question and result in a vision of international law that is either undesirably
extreme or near irreconcilably fragmented. Both problems can be
explained by means of the aporia of the structure of general international
law proposed by critical international legal theories.14
As discussed in the next section, the structural and normative
problems encountered by the currently predominant theories of
international investment law are not the necessary byproducts of the
structure of investor-state arbitration itself.15 Rather, these theories are
descriptively inconsistent with the practice of investor-state arbitration. It
is therefore possible to provide a better account of the foundation, structure,
and development of the role of international law in the resolution of
investor-state disputes than any of the currently predominant theories
provide.16
A. Investor-State Awards as Evincing Customary International Law
Until recently, the most widely accepted theory of international
investment law was that the explosion of IIAs in their own right created
customary international law.17 This theory posits that the specific content
of these customary norms is developed in investor-state arbitrations
resolving political risk disputes.18 Reliance upon a consistent line of
investor-state arbitral decisions, therefore, is a means to determine the
customary international law standard to be applied in any given dispute.19
12

See discussion infra Part II.B.
See discussion infra Part II.C.
14
See supra note 9.
15
See discussion infra Part III.
16
See discussion infra Part IV.
17
See, e.g., Stephen M. Schwebel, The Influence of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Customary
International Law, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 27 (2004). This theory is distinct from the position,
subscribed to by other commentators, that some BIT “rights are a confirmation of obligations
Sovereigns owe under customary international law, others are new.” Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy
Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent
Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1532 (2005) [hereinafter Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis].
18
See, e.g., Andreas Lowenfeld, Investment Agreements and International Law, 42 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 123, 129 (2003).
19
This appears to be the rationale for investor-state decisions self-consciously adopting a
jurisprudence constante approach such as Saipem SpA v. Bangladesh, infra note 169. See Gabriele
Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse, 23 ARB. INT’L 357, 377 (2007).
For a full list of relevant decisions, see infra note 169.
13
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Conversely, divergence from a line of consistent decisions on a relevant
point of law is legally fallacious because it is inconsistent with customary
international law.20 Champions of this theory include Judge Stephen
Schwebel, a former President of the International Court of Justice;21
Professor Andreas Lowenfeld, a pioneer of the study of international law in
the world economy;22 Professor José Alvarez, a former President of the
American Society of International Law;23 and Professor Gabriele
Kaufmann-Kohler, a leading arbitrator of investor-state disputes.24 As
discussed in this section, this theory is neither descriptively nor
normatively defensible because it imposes an inapposite principle of
property protection over IIAs and the decisions interpreting them.
1. Rival Conceptions of Customary International Law
The invocation of customary international law must be placed in
context. The rapid expansion of international law has led to controversy
over what customary international law is and how it is proved. Classically,
customary international law is defined as “evidence of a general practice
accepted as law.”25 Its proof required a showing of “widespread and
representative state practice” and a showing that this state practice arose
out of sense of legal obligation, or opinio juris.26 But scholars (and courts)
now disagree about what constitutes “state practice,” and how (or whether)
to prove the subjective recognition by states of the legal force compelling
the practice.27
Classical positivists regard this debate as a dangerous “Trojan horse,”
undercutting the link between state consent and positive international law

20

See Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 19, at 377.
See Schwebel, supra note 17; see also Judge Stephan A. Schwebel, 24 LINCOLN’S INN FIELDS,
http://www.londonarbitrators.net/cvs/sschw.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
22
Compare Lowenfeld, supra note 18, with ANDREAS LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
LAW (2002). The earlier edition of the similarly entitled book published by Matthew Bender in the
1980s was hailed as a leader in the field. See Richard Gardner, Book Reviews and Notes, 76 AM. J.
INT’L L. 868, 902 (1982) (reviewing PAOLO PICONE & GIORGIO SACERDOTI, DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE
DELL’ ECONOMIA (1982)).
23
José E. Alvarez, A Bit on Custom, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 17, 32, 57–59 (2009) [hereinafter
Alvarez, A Bit on Custom]; see also Biography of José E. Alvarez, NYU LAW, https://its.law.nyu.edu/
facultyprofiles/profile.cfm?section=bio&personID=30514 (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
24
See Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 19; see also Michael D. Goldhaber, Arbitration Scorecard
2011: The Biggest Cases You Never Heard Of, AM. LAW., July 6, 2011, http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/
amlawdaily/2011/07/arbscorecard2011.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
25
Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 933 [hereinafter
ICJ Statute], available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0&.
26
See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf (W. Ger. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 42–44 (Feb. 20).
27
See, e.g., J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449,
458–59 (2000) (“CIL is an example of nominalization. It survives only because nations and theorists
mean radically different things when they use the term.”).
21
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in the pursuit of a utopian agenda.28 Depending upon the evidence
available in a given dispute, a custom is established in the absence of clear
state practice premised exclusively upon the moral force of the rule
invoked.29 In other cases, customary international law was established
solely on the basis of state acts. These state acts have been further diluted
to permit creation of custom through recent conventional acts of states, i.e.,
the fact of participation in a treaty.30 At times, the same piece of evidence,
such as conclusion of a multilateral treaty, would be cited as evidence of
the state practice element or evidence of the opinio juris element.31 In
short, classical positivists are correct that the proliferation of customary
international law rules in international awards and judgments facially does
not meet the traditional elements of customary international law proof.
The most radical departure from classically positive customary
international law sought to justify this shift in the context of human rights
adjudications.32 It argued that these adjudications reflected a form of “new
custom.”33 This new custom relied heavily upon opinio juris even in the
absence of consistent state practice.34 It derived this opinio juris from

28

See, e.g., Hilary Charlesworth, The Unbearable Lightness of Customary International Law, 92
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 44, 44 (1998) (“In his stern critique of ‘relative normativity,’ Prosper Weil
presented customary law as a type of Trojan horse by which the homogenous normativity of traditional
international law was threatened.”); see also Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in
International Law, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 413, 433–34 (1983); see also Kelly, supra note 27, at 458.
29
See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nic. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
14, 97–99 (June 27); Charlesworth, supra note 28, at 45 (“the Nicaragua case, which identified
customary norms limiting the use of force and intervention despite the lack of supporting state practice,
has been much criticized”); Anthea Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary
International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 758–59 (2001) [hereinafter Roberts,
Traditional and Modern Approaches]. But see Herbert W. Briggs, The International Court of Justice
Lives Up to Its Name, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 78 (1987) (noting that the recognition of the customary rule by
both parties in pleadings justified the conclusion of opposability of the customary rule to the United
States).
30
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nic. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 95
(June 27) (citing approvingly North Sea Continental Shelf); see North Sea Continental Shelf (W. Ger. v.
Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20).
31
Compare Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nic. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 98–99 (June 27) (relying upon UN Charter to supply opinio juris), with North Sea Continental
Shelf (W. Ger. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 38–39 (Feb. 20) (discussing the possibility of reliance upon a
multilateral convention in an area in which “State practice [previously] lacked uniformity”); see also
Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 146, 150 (1987) (including the
evidence of conclusion of the UN Charter for the proposition of non-intervention at issue in the
Nicaragua case in opinio juris and potentially including conclusion of multilateral treaties addressing
maritime border issues in state practice).
32
See, e.g., Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches, supra note 29.
33
Id.
34
See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State “Sovereignty,” 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 31,
38–39 (1996) (“[L]aw is ‘constitutional,’ in a new sense. The international system, having identified
contemporary human values, has adopted and declared them to be fundamental law, international law.
But, in a radical derogation from the axiom of ‘sovereignty,’ that law is not based on consent: at least, it
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nearly universal consent of states to treaties, U.N. General Assembly
resolutions, or common positions in the drafting of a multilateral treaty.35
This view of custom thus openly rejects the positivists’ conservative
conception that only longstanding state practice can prove formal
acceptance of a customary legal rule by the state against which it is
invoked.36
The proposition that IIAs and decisions interpreting them constitute
customary international law depends critically upon the persuasiveness of
its view of customary international law. Resolving this problem is beyond
the scope of this Article.
2. The Descriptive Flaw of IIAs as Custom
The customary international law view of IIAs takes the side of new
custom. Its champions admit that a subjective sense of legal obligation on
the part of signatory states to extend the protections contained in these
instruments cannot be proved.37 As new custom, it operates deductively
from a strong (moral) principle of protection of property.38 It claims that
this principle garnered near universal consent through IIAs.39
Problematically for the champions of IIAs as customary international law,
there is no such near universal consent.40
As an initial matter, there is no multilateral consensus on the
substance of investment protection.41 The failure of several successive
multilateral treaties weakens the claim that bilateral IIAs evidence near

does not honor or accept dissent, and it binds particular states regardless of their objection.”). This
custom resides on the extreme of Kirgis’ sliding scale. See Kirgis, supra note 31, at 150.
35
See, e.g., Louis B. Sohn, Generally Accepted International Rules, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1073, 1074
(1986); Legality of the Threat of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J 226, 254 (July 8); see also Pemmaraju
Sreenivasa Rao, Multiple International Judicial Forums: A Reflection of the Growing Strength of
Internationanl Law or its Fragmentation, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 929, 942–43 (2004) (discussing the
Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons decision).
36
See, e.g., Charlesworth, supra note 28.
37
See, e.g., Lowenfeld, supra note 18, at 129–30; Kelly, supra note 27, at 460, 469; M.
SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 82–85 (2010); see also Patrick
Dumberry, Are BITs Representing the “New” Customary International Law in International Investment
Law?, 28 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 675, 690–93 (2010); Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties
That Hurt Them: The Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 666–67
(1998) (“LDCs face a prisoner’s dilemma in which it is optimal for them, as a group, to reject the Hull
Rule, but in which each individual LDC is better off ‘defecting’ from the group by signing a BIT that
gives it an advantage over other LDCs in the competition to attract foreign investors.”).
38
See infra note 43. For the deductive nature of new custom, see Bruno Simma, Book Note,
Georges Abi-Saab, Cours Général de Droit International Public, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 577, 578 (1998).
39
See supra notes 34–35.
40
See infra note 43.
41
SORNARAJAH, supra note 37, at 81–82, 233.
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universal support for a strong principle of investment protection.42
Bilateral IIAs differ significantly both between treaty programs and within
the same program.43 These differences concern the scope of critical
investment protections, such as the fair and equitable treatment standard,
arbitrary treatment, the expropriation standard, and the scope of regulatory
action that, by agreement of the treaty parties, falls entirely outside the
scope of these treaties.44 These differences undercut claims that there is
agreement on a meaningful principle of property protection in IIAs.
Champions of the customary international law theory cannot
overcome this problem by arguing that certain provisions in IIAs are
sufficiently uniform to create custom.45 This position leads to a snippet
hunt for isolated treaty language without providing a rationale why these
treaty provisions can be read in isolation.46 Furthermore, even if treaty
provisions could be isolated, it is far from clear whether the drafting of
later generation investment treaties did not in fact narrow the range of
treaty protections by other means such as the inclusion of non-precluded
measures clauses—a development which an isolated reading would not
take into account.47
The claim that IIAs would create new custom is not without irony.
Champions of IIAs as custom typically deny that UN General Assembly
resolutions purporting to limit the scope of international law with regard to
the rights of aliens, especially with regard to natural resource investments,

42
A strong case could be made (and has been made) to the contrary. See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 8,
at 1058 (“[T]he fragmented codification of international investment law is a key, and underappreciated,
reason that states have been unable to agree on a truly multilateral set of investment rules.”).
43
See id. at 1059–67; SORNARAJAH, supra note 37, at 81–82, 233; see also Bernard Kishoiyian,
The Utility of Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Formulation of Customary International Law, 14 NW.
J. INT’L L. & BUS. 327 (1994) (insufficient congruence between BITs to create a customary norm);
Matthew C. Porterfield, An International Common Law of Investor Rights?, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L.
79 (2006) (the asserted customary international law minimum standard of treatment is too amorphous to
constitute a legal rule); Dumberry, supra note 37, at 685–90.
44
See supra note 43.
45
See Alvarez, A Bit on Custom, supra note 23, at 32–33.
46
Impregilo S.p.A. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, Concurring and Dissenting Opinions of
Professor Brigitte Stern (June 21, 2011).
47
See, e.g., Kenneth Vandevelde, A Comparison of the 2004 and 1994 U.S. Model BITs,
Rebalancing Investor and Host Country Interests, Y.B. INT’L L. & POL’Y 283, 288 (2008) (“The second
objective was to preserve greater regulatory discretion for the BIT parties. This was to be achieved by
increasing the number of general exceptions to BIT obligations, by allowing the parties greater latitude
to maintain or adopt measures that do not conform to certain BIT obligations.”). By ignoring the
exceptions provisions, the customary international law advocates would thus ignore the balance
intended to be struck for example with regard to the facially broader expropriation provisions. See also
Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of States,
104 AM. J. INT’L L. 179, 223 (2010) (“Scrutiny of the internal practices of the treaty parties or states as
a whole would demonstrate that these standards are unrealistic and inappropriate for use as the
threshold for review.”).
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created custom that relies on the traditional definition of custom.48 Their
own invocation of the new customary theory in the current, changed
climate thus seems at best opportunistic and at worst, hypocritical.
Even admitting that the champions of IIAs as new custom had it right,
custom would swing between extremes at an alarming rate. In twenty
years, new custom would swing from strong investment protection at the
end of World War II to a significant limitation of investment protection in
the 1960s and 1970s.49 In another twenty years, it would swing back again
to strong investment protection through the adoption of IIAs.50 The
perceived backlash against IIAs could be used by IIA opponents as
evidence of yet another sea change, swinging the pendulum of new custom
back to the 1970s.51 The customary international law of investment
protection would thus change more quickly than the ordinary shelf life of a
production sharing agreement to which it would apply.52 This consequence
of adoption of a new custom framework shows that the attempt is
ultimately impractical.
3. The Normative Flaw of IIAs as Custom
In the absence of evidence of consistent state practice or opinio juris,
the customary international law position is reduced to simple policy
preference. It prefers universalizing the IIA interpretations of the first
generation of investor-state arbitrations.53 Because there is no external
descriptive reason why this line of decisions should be preferred, i.e., state
practice or opinio juris, the preference must be defended normatively.54
The normative defense would have to explain why the law would be better
or bring about better results if it were organized following this first
generation of decisions. Such a normative defense is almost entirely absent
in the literature defending this point of view. As it stands, the customary
international law position appears to rest on an arbitrary policy
preference.55

48

See Alvarez, A Bit on Custom, supra note 23, at 39.
See supra note 43.
50
See supra note 43.
51
SORNARAJAH, supra note 37, at 81–82, 233.
52
See, e.g., Robert Peachey, Comment, Petroleum Investment Contracts After the Baku-TblisiCeyhan (BTC) Pipeline, 31 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 739, 740 (2011) (discussing production sharing
agreement with 30 year term); Ernest E. Smith, From Concessions to Service Contracts, 27 TULSA L.J.
493, 516 (1992) (discussing 20 year time frame for production sharing agreements). Placing the custom
argument on a “sliding scale” does not assist in the argument as the problems identified concern both
state practice and opinio juris. See Kirgis, supra note 31, at 150.
53
See Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 19, at 377.
54
See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
55
See Lowenfeld, supra note 18; Alvarez, A Bit on Custom, supra note 23; Schwebel¸ supra note
17; Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 19.
49
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The customary international law thesis also threatens the legitimacy of
the entire IIA enterprise. The continued use of IIAs depends upon the faith
of treaty parties that the bargains reflected in their mutually agreed upon
treaty language will in fact be enforced. Champions of the customary
international law undercut this faith when hunting for snippets of preferred
treaty provisions across IIAs in order to generate evidence of conforming
state practice.56 The result of the snippet hunt is a supposed affirmation of
principles contained in early model U.S. BITs as custom.57 This customary
international law then feeds back into the interpretation of IIAs that
precisely negotiated away from the early U.S. BIT positions.58 Customary
international law, ironically, is used as a bulwark against treaty practice in
a way that reveals a principled preference for stronger investment
protection provisions on the part of its champions.59 It appears to be
precisely the Trojan horse that classical positivists warned the invocation of
customary international law had become.60
This does not mean that the customary international law thesis has
been entirely unsuccessful. The notion that there is no international legal
obligation, at all, owed to foreign investors is certainly no longer defensible
given the current treaty practice.61 Further, the proponents of the
customary international law thesis recognized a feature of critical
significance: “[I]n practice, publicly available arbitral decisions, including
those by investor-state arbitrators, are more than just ‘subsidiary means for
the determination of rules of law.’”62 They are important “simply because
such bodies necessarily are required to apply law to concrete facts and
generally operate within a tradition that discourages findings of ‘nonliquet.’”63 This insight is critical for understanding to what kind of system
of international law arbitral decisions contribute. But its significance, as is
also discussed below, does not depend upon the inclusion of the rules of
decisions developed in earlier decisions in customary international law.

56

Alvarez, A Bit on Custom, supra note 23, at 32, 42–43.
See, e.g., Schwebel, supra note 17, at 30.
58
See, e.g., Vandevelde, supra note 47, at 288.
59
See, e.g., Schwebel, supra note 17, at 30 (“All this said, in the last few years elements of opinion
in the U.S., evidencing an antipathy to foreign investment comparable to that shown at the time of the
American Revolution, seem intent on crippling a U.S. policy that has endured for more than one
hundred fifty years. The new model BIT embodies regressive changes that are deplorable. They have
the further deficiency of prejudicing my thesis.”).
60
See supra note 28.
61
See, e.g., SORNARAJAH, supra note 37, at 82–85, 184 (describing the confused state of the law at
the beginning of the IIA era).
62
Alvarez, A Bit on Custom, supra note 23, at 45; Lowenfeld, supra note 18, at 129.
63
Alvarez, A Bit on Custom, supra note 23, at 46.
57
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B. Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle
At the other extreme, some authors submit that IIAs and arbitral
decisions interpreting them are odious or unfair.64 These authors therefore
reject that arbitral decisions should have much of any legal or persuasive
force.65 They argue that the IIA process has introduced multinational
corporations as a new, powerful, and unregulated international legal actor.66
They further assert that arbitral decisions inherently and illegitimately favor
the corporate interests over the sovereign regulatory prerogative of the host
state and thereby do serious damage to developing states.67 The leading
champion of this position is Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah.68 Others
include Professors Gus Van Harten, David Schneiderman, Peter
Muchlinski, and, as muse if not participant, Andrew Guzman.69
1. The Critique of IIAs and Investor-State Arbitration
At its core, the critical movement argues that “the writings of
publicists and the decisions of tribunals, including arbitral tribunals, are
eminently manipulable towards the creation of an international law that
applies to foreign investments.”70 Multinational companies,71 and their

64

See Gus Van Harten et al., Public Statement on the International Investment Regime (Sept. 2,
2010) [hereinafter Van Harten Statement], available at http://alainet.org/active/40578&lang=es.
65
SORNARAJAH, supra note 37.
66
Id. at 6, 55, 57, 61. For a detailed discussion of a corporate regulatory agenda, see PETER T.
MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE & THE LAW 81–122 (2007) (concluding that “there has
been a transformation in political discourse which challenges not the legitimacy and value of free
private enterprise as such, but its legitimacy as a polluter, an abuser of market power, a corruptor of
state officials, an exploiter of workers, and a potential accomplice to violations of fundamental human
rights”); see also Isabella D. Bunn, Global Advocacy for Corporate Accountability: Transatlantic
Perspectives from the NGO Community, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1265 (2004) (outlining key areas of
action for NGOs to increase corporate regulation).
67
See Van Harten Statement, supra note 64; SORNARAJAH, supra note 37, at 82, 229–30, 313;
DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION, INVESTMENT RULES AND
DEMOCRACY’S PROMISE 208, 223–37 (2008).
68
SORNARAJAH, supra note 37; see also Biography of Professor M. Sornarajah, NAT’L UNIV. OF
SING., available at http://law.nus.edu.sg/about_us/faculty/staff/staffcv/sornarajahcv2012.pdf (last
visited Jan. 21, 2013) (rejecting the use of arbitral decisions as legal authorities by investor-state
tribunals because these decisions impermissibly favor corporate over sovereign interests).
69
See Van Harten Statement, supra note 64 (Professors Sornarajah, Van Harten, Schneiderman,
and Muchlinski are the principal drafters of the document); see also Guzman, supra note 37.
70
SORNARAJAH, supra note 37, at 52. On recent charges of manipulation in the appointment
process, see Jan Paulsson, First Inaugural Lecture as Michael R. Klein Distinguished Scholar Chair,
University of Miami School of Law: Moral Hazard in International Dispute Resolution (Apr. 29, 2010),
available at http://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/0/12773749999020/paulsson_moral_hazard.pdf
(arguing that when counsel act as arbitrators in investor-state arbitrations they are more likely to adopt
positions beneficial to their future clients).
71
See SORNARAJAH, supra note 37, at 239, 297.
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“inventive” and “lost lawyers,” use litigation strategies to allegedly
manipulate the law and demonstrate “the adverse use to which treaty
principles could be put.”72 Consequently, tribunals “often show a nearfundamentalist zeal for investment protection to the exclusion of other
considerations such as economic development, human rights and the
environment.”73 This leads to the rejection of the notion that “a small
group of persons can foist a system on the whole world by an esoteric
process to which others are not privy.”74 According to the critics, this
system is as corrupt as it is opaque.
Apart from charges of greed and manipulation, critics also reject the
narrower notion that BIT awards could be used to cross-fertilize resolution
of future disputes premised upon other BITs. The concordant will of states
is the principal basis of international law.75 In this context, they note that
“[i]t is highly unlikely that . . . a regime has come about simply because . . .
there is simply a lack of concordance in treaty principles.”76 Treaties
within one program differ from each other significantly because “[m]odel
investment treaties are redrafted with the benefit of earlier experiences.”77
The differences only increase across treaty programs so that each treaty
bargain will have to be interpreted ad hoc in light of its specific context.78
Given these important differences between treaties, “arbitral tribunals or
the writings of highly qualified publicists are not significant sources of law,
and any theory of international law based entirely on such sources will be
tainted with the weakness of the sources on which it is built.”79
These critics do recognize that “[t]here is a systematic pattern in [the]
use [of general principles of law] by arbitral tribunals and precedents have
been built upon on the basis of past awards recognizing general

72
Id. at 24–25. A similar critique of investor-state arbitration was advanced in GUS VAN HARTEN,
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 5–6, 121–85 (2007); Amr A. Shalakany,
Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias Under the Specter of Neoliberalism, 41
HARV. INT’L L. J. 419 (2000); see also Christopher J. Borgen, Transnational Tribunals and the
Transmission of Norms: The Hegemony of Process, 39 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 685, 751–56 (2007)
(noting that an institutional bias exists when there is an issue link between investment law and, for
example, environmental law).
73
SORNARAJAH, supra note 37, at 82.
74
Id. at 303; see also Prabhakar Singh, Macbeth’s Three Witches: Capitalism, Common Good and
International Law, 14 OR. REV. INT’L L. 47, 64–68 (2012) (advocating “efficient breach of international
law” on the premise of M. Sornarajah’s analysis).
75
SORNARAJAH, supra note 37, at 88–143.
76
Id. at 179.
77
Id. at 182.
78
Id. at 186–87; see also Jason Webb Yackee, Pacta Sunt Servanda and State Promises to Foreign
Investors Before Bilateral Investment Treaties, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1550, 1610 (2009) (noting that
the primary problem is the “increasing tendency of analysts to view BIT promises as not simply lex
specialis, binding only between treaty partners, but as both indicative of and constituting a universal,
one-size-fits-all, customary international law of foreign investment.”).
79
SORNARAJAH, supra note 37, at 290.
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principles.”80 They accept the “existence of some general principles” that
“cannot be denied.”81 But even these general principles do not save the use
of prior decisions by arbitral tribunals because the “principles which have
been extracted have been challenged as being based on the subjective
choices of individual arbitrators and scholars predisposed to building up a
system of investment protection.”82 Thus, “[t]he idea that a contract made
by a state is defeasible in the public interest is demonstrably common to all
legal systems” but not reflected in the general principles applied by
international tribunals.83
The end goal of this line of criticism is to strengthen the state’s
regulatory power and limit the potential of international legal liability for
what the authors consider to be the inherent regulatory right of the state. It
limits the scope of international review of state conduct towards foreign
nationals.84 Its appeal to sovereignty is premised nearly exclusively upon
the primacy of state conduct.85 This conduct is argued to support the idea
that absolute sovereignty is required to protect environmental norms and
human rights, which are goals that would be unprofitable for multinational
corporations to protect.86
2. The Descriptive Flaw of the Critique
The critique of investor-state arbitration cannot substantiate the central
claim of bias or manipulation empirically. The statistics provided by the
main investor-state arbitration institution, the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), report that 23% of ICSID
investor-state disputes are dismissed at the jurisdictional or screening
stage.87 In fact, investors receive any kind of recovery in only 48% of
cases.88 In the majority of these 48% of cases in which investors do
80

Id. at 86.
Id.
82
Id. at 292. For further discussion of the historical challenges to general principles of law in
disputes between host states and investors, see Georges Delaume, Comparative Analysis as a Basis of
Law in State Contracts: The Myth of the Lex Mercatoria, 63 TUL. L. REV. 575 (1989); Jarrod Wong,
Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties: Of Breaches of Contract, Treaty Violations, and the
Divide Between Developing and Developed Countries in Foreign Investment Disputes, 14 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 135 (2007).
83
SORNARAJAH, supra note 37, at 293, 296.
84
Id. at 290, 299–300.
85
Id. at 299, 313.
86
Id. at 55–60 (“Once it is conceded that multinational corporations can both benefit and harm
economic development, it is easy to adopt the position that foreign investment should be harnessed to
the objective of economic development and must be carefully regulated to achieve this end.”).
87
ICSID,
ICSID
CASELOAD—STATISTICS
(ISSUE
2012-2)
13,
available
at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocume
nt&CaseLoadStatistics=True&language=English32 (last visited Apr. 23, 2014).
88
Id.
81
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recover, they recover at a rate significantly below their asserted damages
claim.89
Recent surveys of investor-state arbitrations have found that the winloss ratio of host states in investor-state arbitrations does not significantly
differ from the win-loss ratio in other types of legal proceedings.90
Development of the parties was a statistically insignificant factor, i.e., the
surveys are not skewed by the presence of developed countries as investorstate arbitration respondents.91 The charge that appointment of a small
cabal of elite arbitrators “foisted” a regime that is “zealously” in favor of
international investors has similarly been debunked as flatly inconsistent
with the set of awards rendered by “elite arbitrators.”92
The asserted weakness of arbitral awards as a source of international
law is also inconsistent with the voluntarist paradigm the critics appear to
espouse. Both investors and host states routinely rely upon such awards.93
States invoking investor-state awards as authoritatively supporting their
case have included least-developed states,94 developing states,95 developed
states,96 Asian states,97 European states,98 North American states,99 South

89

See, e.g., Linda A. Ahee, Leonardo Giacchino & Richard E. Walck, Historical Analysis of ICSID
Concluded Cases, 5 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REV. (2011).
90
See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims about Investment Treaty Arbitration,
86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 48–52 (2007); Daphna Kapeliuk, The Repeat Appointment Factor: Exploring
Decision Patterns of Elite Investment Arbitrators, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 47, 81 (2010).
91
Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 435, 465 (2009).
92
Kapeliuk, supra note 90, at 81 (2010) (“The results thus show that arbitration tribunals involving
elite arbitrators do not have a tendency to render compromise awards. Moreover, since most awards
dismissed all investors’ claims and more than 80% of all decisions rendered an award of less than 40%
of the amount claimed, the results clearly do not support the claim that investment-arbitration tribunals
display a tendency to rule in favor of investors.”).
93
For further discussion, see infra Part III.
94
See, e.g., Biwater Gauff (Tanz.) Ltd. v. Tanz., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, ¶¶ 430–432,
438 (July 24, 2008) (Tanzania relying on Waste Management v. Mexico as an analogous case with
regard to the fair and equitable treatment and expropriation claims, Azinian v. Mexico as a relevant
analogue for the expropriation claim, and Tecmed v. Mexico as a relevant authority with regard to the
requirement of permanence of a measure to constitute an expropriation). Tanzania is a developing
country.
See
List
of
Developing
Countries,
USAID
(Feb.
6,
2012),
http://transition.usaid.gov/policy/ads/300/310maa.pdf (listing Tanzania as a low income country).
95
See, e.g., Paushok et al. v. Mong., Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶¶ 2.3, 285 (Apr. 28, 2011),
http://italaw.com/documents/PaushokAward.pdf (Mongolia relying on the discrimination standard set out in
Champion Trading v. Egypt, Sempra v. Argentina, and the expropriation standard set out in LG&E v.
Argentina). Mongolia is a middle low-income country. See List of Developing Countries, USAID (Feb. 6,
2012), http://transition.usaid.gov/policy/ads/300/310maa.pdf.
96
See infra Part III.B.2, discussing the submissions of the United States on the content of the
international minimum standard of treatment in Glamis.
97
Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide v. Phil., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Award,
¶ 288 (Aug. 16, 2007) (Philippines relying on the definition of “investment” in Salini Costruttori S.p.A.
and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco).
98
Frontier Petroleum Services Ltd. v. Czech Republic, Award, ¶ 258 (Nov. 12, 2010) (Czech
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American states,100 and African states.101 State behavior thus gives greater
importance to arbitral decisions than critics deem appropriate. This change
in behavior, in and of itself, means that a purely descriptive theory of
international law premised upon the actions of states would not support the
narrow conclusion that arbitral decisions are a “weak” source of law
without support in state practice.
3. The Normative Flaw of the Critique
The critical project’s normative flaws mirror those of the customary
international law thesis. Like the customary international law thesis, it
ultimately must admit that it “cannot be denied” that IIAs and arbitral
awards interpreting them have created a reality that is at least partially at
odds with the critical paradigm.102 Like the customary international law
thesis, the critical project hunts for snippets of state practice to affirm the
primacy of strong sovereignty.103 Like the customary international law
thesis, it assumes that its criteria for snippet hunting are ultimately correct
without explaining why it chose those criteria.
The problem for critics is that they assume, rather than substantiate,
the claim that strong sovereignty is preferable to strong property protection.
Critics assume that development in least developed states would improve if
regulatory power were left exclusively to host state governments.104 This
presumption then feeds back into the negative view of IIAs that precisely
negotiated away from this policy presumption.105 But this assumption is
neither defended nor ultimately empirically defendable.106
Again ironically, a voluntarist paradigm is used as a bulwark against
treaty practice in a way that reveals a principled preference for weaker
investment protection provisions on the part of its champions.107 The
critique thus repeats the same mistake as the theory it attacks, crippling the
Republic explaining “that the vast majority of investment treaty awards have limited the obligation of
full protection and security to ensuring the physical safety of the investment property and personnel in
the host state consistent with the resources available to the host state, which Respondent notes is in line
with the historical development of the standard in customary international law”).
99
See infra Part III.B.2, discussing the submissions of the United States on the content of the
international minimum standard of treatment in Glamis.
100
Brandes Inv. Partners, L.P. v. Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/3, Award, ¶ 72 (Aug. 2, 2011)
(Venezuela relying on Plama v. Bulgaria).
101
Jan de Nul NV & Dredging Int’l NV v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/13, Award, ¶ 182 (Oct.
24, 2008) (Egypt relying on Lowen v. United States and Saipem v. Bangladesh regarding exhaustion of
remedies).
102
SORNARAJAH, supra note 37, at 86.
103
Id. at 297.
104
See, e.g., SCHNEIDERMAN, supra note 67, at 223–37.
105
See, e.g., Van Harten Statement, supra note 64.
106
See infra note 133.
107
See, e.g., Van Harten Statement, supra note 64.
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ability of states and others to use international law as a problem solving
tool.
This does not mean that the purely critical insights of proponents of
this view can be dismissed out of hand. They rightfully point out overgeneralizations and deep lacunae in the theories presented by others. It is
in these “critical” elements that the doubters of current conceptions of
“investment law” largely do and should succeed.
C. Grand Bargains and Self-Contained Regimes
Current scholarship seeks the middle ground between these extremes.
Its insight is that there exists an “epistemic community” of international
lawyers and scholars focusing their practice and research on international
investment law issues. This “epistemic community” is a “network[] of
professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular
domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within that
domain.”108 To this epistemic community, the network of approximately
3,000 IIAs created a self-contained international legal regime.109 This
regime forms the background conditions for all future interpretation of
IIAs.110
This regime is less than full-fledged customary international law, i.e.,
regime theory addresses “the strong similarity among treaties and the
common concepts, language, structure, and processes they employ” but
“[w]ithout resolving the debate as to whether or investment treaties
constitute customary international law.”111 But it nevertheless rejects the
claims of critical movement that IIAs should be treated as purely bilateral
bargains.112

108

JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 13 (2010) (quoting Peter M. Haas,
Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy, in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 3
(1993)) [hereinafter SALACUSE, LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES]; Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging
Global Regime for Investment, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 427, 465–66 (2010).
109
See SALACUSE, LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 108.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 5.
112
STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 280–
81 (2009); SALACUSE, LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 108, at 8–11. The champions of this
theoretical approach include Professor Jeswald Salacuse of the Tufts Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy and Dr. Stephan Schill of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and
International Law in Heidelberg. See Biography of Professor Jeswald Salacuse, THE FLETCHER SCH.,
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/~/media/Fletcher/Directory/CVs/cv_Salacuse_Jeswald.pdf (last visited Jan. 21,
2013); Biography of Dr. Stephan W. Schill, MAX PLANCK INST., http://www.rzuser.uniheidelberg.de/~p00/down/cv_schill.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2013); see also Commission, supra note 3,
at 136–41; Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty
System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45, 49 (2013) (arguing that “investment system exists at the intersection of
multiple fields, and it will not achieve adulthood until participants embrace and theorize its sui generis
platypus-like nature or transfigure it into some other animal altogether”). For further discussion of
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1. Self-Contained Regimes in General International Law
The invocation of a “regime” of investment protection in international
law, like the invocation of customary international law, has to be placed in
context. The growth of international law caused several scholars to warn of
the risk of a loss of the coherence and normative force international law,
leading to its ultimate fragmentation.113 Self-contained regimes are a unit
into which international law could break off or “fragment”—the fact and
implications of their existence have stirred significant controversy in its
own right to the point of making fragmentation of international law an
object of study for the United Nations’ International Law Commission
(ILC).114
The ILC observed a state of significant terminological confusion.115 A
self-contained regime narrowly refers to a special set of rules concerning
the consequences of a violation of an international legal obligation.116
Alternatively, it “refer[s] to interrelated wholes of primary and secondary
rules, sometimes referred to as ‘systems’ or ‘subsystems’ of rules that
cover some particular problem differently from the way it would be
covered under general law.”117 In the event of such a subsystem, the
complex subject matter of the field in fact requires expertise beyond what
general international lawyers (such a judges on the International Court of
Justice) possess.118 In this broader sense, a self-contained regime has
“effect predominantly through providing interpretive guidance and
direction that in some way deviates from the rules of general law.”119
The “interpretive guidance” provided by a self-contained regime
partially displaces the traditional “systematic integration” in treaty
Clash of Paradigms, see Frederic G. Sourgens & Baiju S. Vasani, Doubling Down on Deference?
Treatment Standards and the Public Law Fallacy, 7 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REV. (2013).
113
See, e.g., Weil, supra note 28, at 430 (With regard to “fragmentation of normativity,” the author
notes that “[a] normativity subject to unlimited gradation is one doomed to flabbiness, one that in the
end will be reduced to a convenient term of art, covering a great variety of realities difficult to grasp.
Like the ‘variable legal authority’ of subnormative acts, the graduated normativity of normative acts is a
notion so elusive as to escape comprehension.”). For an historical survey of fragmentation in
international law, see Rao, supra note 35, at 931–39; Bruno Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and
the Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 483, 483–85 (2006).
114
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and
Expansion of International Law, Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 58th Sess., May 1–June 9, July 3–Aug.
11, 2006, U.N. DOC. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) [hereinafter ILC Fragmentation].
115
Id. at 68.
116
Id. On the derogation from such “secondary rules,” see Simma & Pulkowski, supra note 113, at
483.
117
ILC Fragmentation, supra note 114, at 68.
118
See Rao, supra note 35, at 944–45 (quoting Rosalyn Higgins, Respecting the Sovereign States
and the Running a Tight Courtroom, 50 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 121, 122 (2001)).
119
ILC Fragmentation, supra note 114, at 70.
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interpretation.120 Such systemic integration requires that other international
legal obligations of the parties be taken into account in interpreting the
treaty language at issue in a given case.121 In a self-contained regime,
systemic integration operates when there is a renvoi to general international
law (such as, for example, the meaning of statehood).122 Barring such an
immediate intersect with general international law, interpretation first and
foremost makes the treaty provision coherent with the remainder of the
subsystem—even if that sub system does not contain any relevant legal
obligations between the parties in question.123 It is when this integration
does not resolve how interpretation should proceed that other sources of
international law will be consulted.124
2. International Investment Law as a Self-Contained Regime
The “regime” theorists of international investment law assert that the
web of approximately 3,000 IIAs and the jurisprudence under them has led
to the creation of a regime in this stronger sense.125 IIA awards take
precedence over and displace systemic integration under the Vienna
120
Id. at 70, 80; see also Simma & Pulkowski, supra note 113, at 488 (“[B]oth the International
Court of Justice and the Claims Tribunal, in a first step, examined the content of the rule of general
international law and considered, in a second step, whether states in the particular case had derogated
from this standard by creating a more special set of rules. Tribunals established under a special legal
subsystem—such as WTO panels or the European Court of Justice—generally follow the reverse order
of examination. They are primarily concerned with the content of ‘their’ special law.”).
121
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(3)(c), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter VCLT]; see also ILC Fragmentation, supra note 114, at 206–43; RICHARD K.
GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 260–76, 278–81, 284–87 (2008).
122
See ILC Fragmentation, supra note 114, at 96 (“To press upon a perhaps self-evident point,
there is no special ‘WTO rule’ on statehood, or a ‘human rights notion’ of transit passage, as little as
there is a special rule about State immunities within the European Court of Human Rights or a WTOspecific notion of ‘exhaustible resources.’”).
123
See VCLT, supra note 121, art. 31(4); see also ILC Fragmentation, supra note 114, at 82;
GARDINER, supra note 121, at 291–98; see also Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, RegimeCollisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L.
999, 1014 (2004) (“In contrast to the courts of developed Nation-States that guarantee legal unity,
globally dispersed courts, tribunals, arbitration panels and alternative dispute resolution bodies are so
closely coupled, both in terms of organization and self-perception, with their own specialized regimes
in the legal periphery that they necessarily contribute to a global legal fragmentation. These conflicts
are a result of the ‘poly-contexturalization’ of law. They are created by the different internal
environments of the legal system, which, for their part, are dependent upon multiple paradigms of social
ordering.”); cf. Simma & Pulkowski, supra note 113, at 505 (The authors summarize the regime
approach as having “a certain scepticism towards any attempt to ‘smuggle’ alien elements into the
regime. Making use of norms outside the regime is more of an ‘emergency operation’ than a desirable
practice. Tribunals established under particular regimes thus tend to apply a presumption in favour of
complete and exhaustive regulation in the respective regime.”).
124
ILC Fragmentation, supra note 114, at 82, 97–99.
125
SCHILL, supra note 112, at 280–81; SALACUSE, LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note
108, at 8–11.
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Convention on the Law of Treaties.126 Thus, the regime approach
legitimizes current arbitral practice against the critical movement.127
Regime theorists argue that state actors purposefully set up an
independent, internally consistent international investment law regime.
Historically, IIAs show a conscious effort on the part of states to create
uniform textual bases for their IIAs by using the same draft multilateral
conventions as the basis of their own bilateral model treaties.128
Functionally, the parallel legal structures reflect an agreement on common
principles, norms, rules, and dispute resolution mechanisms.129
Doctrinally, the historical and functional “multilateralization” of formally
bilateral IIAs is justified by reference to the Most Favored Nation (MFN)
clause, included in the IIAs.130
The result of the regime approach is a purposive recasting of investorstate decisions to meet the ultimate principle of increased prosperity for the
treaty states through clear rules, i.e., “a promise of protection of capital in
return for the prospect of more capital in the future.”131 This principle is

126

See supra notes 123–125.
See supra notes 123–125.
128
SCHILL, supra note 112, at 40–41, 65, 70–71, 90.
129
SALACUSE, LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 108, at 8 (The basic “principle” of the
regime is the grand bargain “that clear and enforceable rules that protection foreign investors reduce
investment risk, and a reduction in risk, all other things being equal, promotes investment.”). Salacuse
warns that “[b]y principles, regime theorists mean something different from what lawyers and legal
scholars usually understand by that term. Within the context of international regimes, principles may be
defined as ‘beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude.’ Regimes are based on a belief by their participants
that cooperation in a particular area will lead to some desired outcome.” Id. at 6–7. Next, this approach
identifies bilateral investment treaty treatment standards as the “norms” of the regime. Id. at 9–10.
Salacuse explains that “[n]orms in regime theory are defined as ‘standards of behavior defined in terms
of rights and obligations.’” Id. The rules of the regime are the application of the vague norms in
specific situations. Id. at 10. Investor-state dispute resolution is the decision-making procedure of the
regime. Id. at 10–11. On the relationship between political-science regime theory in political science
and self-contained regimes in international law, see Simma & Pulkowski, supra note 113, at 502.
130
SCHILL, supra note 112, at 122. As such, “MFN clauses affect the structure of the international
economic order and impact the system of international investment protection by supporting the
emergence of a uniform international investment regime.” Id. at 124. They do so by attracting
selectively the most favorable investor protection from any IIA signed by the host state and piecing
together the best possible treaty from the investor’s vantage point, thus extending protection to investors
potentially beyond the strongest combination of protections contained in any one treaty. Id. at 140, 159.
Schill further submits that the liberal corporate structuring requirements to fall within BITs further
support the multilateralization of the regime because it does not create significant barrier to entry. See
id. at 197–240.
131
See, e.g., SALACUSE, LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 108, at 111 (“Thus, an
investment agreement between a developed and a developing country is founded on a grand bargain.”).
Salacuse concludes after econometric analysis of U.S. outflows of investment to BIT countries that the
grand bargain does in fact work, noting an increase in investment flows of approximately $1 billion per
annum following conclusion of a U.S. bilateral investment agreement. See Jeswald W. Salacuse &
Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work? An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their
Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67, 109 (2005); see also SCHILL, supra note 112, at 43–44, 106–
127
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critical to defend the existence of the regime.132 It also provides the focal
point for its application.133
3. The Flaws of the Regime Approach
The most challenging problem for the regime approach is the need for
substantive coherence and convergence within the regime, i.e., like cases
must be decided alike.134 Absent such coherence, it is questionable whether
an “epistemic community” exists at all.135 Further, absent coherence, the
regime could provide severely limited interpretive guidance because a later
decision maker cannot identify a “seamless web” into which it could
integrate its new decision.136
Scholars widely comment upon the increasing divergence between IIA
awards.137 They view divergence as the most important legitimacy problem
20, 278, 288, 300. Other studies conclude the opposite, i.e., that bilateral investment treaties have no
effect on investment flows. See, e.g., Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote
Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 397 (2011)
(arguing that BITs have little to no effect on FDI premised upon underwriting decisions of political risk
insurance providers and decisions by in-house counsel in large U.S. corporations); Joseph E. Stiglitz,
Regulating Multinational Corporations: Towards Principles of Cross-Border Legal Frameworks in a
Globalized World Balancing Rights with Responsibilities, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 451, 454–55 nn.7–8
(2007).
132
SALACUSE, LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 108, at 8.
133
SCHILL, supra note 112, at 293–356.
134
See id. at 293.
135
To the extent that the academic community has identified a core “principle,” that the protection
of investment leads to promotion of investments and beneficial development, it is unclear what they
mean by this credo. More worryingly, its empirical accuracy is essentially untested and perhaps
untestable, leading to a cottage industry of dueling economic and econometric studies none of which
appear to have changed the mind of any member of the epistemic community about the role and value
of international law in this field of application. For a representative sample of articles, see supra note
131. The easy reference to markets as the driver behind global legal processes has been criticized in
other contexts as too facile. See Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 123, at 1005. Overall, it is
more likely that the true policy goal behind IIAs is growth (and investment protection), rather than
simple economic development. These policy goals include foreign policy realignments, as well as
deeper realignments with regard to the importance of property rights for the construction of a
sustainable civil society whether globally or locally.
136
See VCLT, supra note 121, art. 31(4); see also ILC Fragmentation, supra note 114, at 82;
GARDINER, supra note 121, at 291–98; see also Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 123, at 1014;
cf. Simma & Pulkowski, supra note 113, at 505 (The authors summarize the regime approach as having
“a certain scepticism towards any attempt to ‘smuggle’ alien elements into the regime. Making use of
norms outside the regime is more of an ‘emergency operation’ than a desirable practice. Tribunals
established under particular regimes thus tend to apply a presumption in favour of complete and
exhaustive regulation in the respective regime.”).
137
See, e.g., Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 17; David A. Gantz, An Appellate
Mechanism for Review of Arbitral Decisions in Investor-State Disputes: Prospects and Challenges, 39
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 39, 44 (2006); Suzannah Linton & Firew Kebede Tiba, The International
Judge in an Age of Multiple International Courts and Tribunals, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 407, 458–61 (2009);
William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a Public Sphere: The Standard
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of the entire IIA enterprise.138 The central factual premise of regime
theorists is thus heavily contested ground.139
And the composition and practice of investor-state tribunals directly
contradicts the existence of a self-contained regime. Investor-state
tribunals are composed of international law and commercial law
generalists.140 They unquestioningly apply the general law of state
responsibility.141 Their decisions adopt legal rationales that borrow
problem solutions from other areas of international law through systemic
integration, including general international law, human rights law, and
trade law.142 In fact, hard cases in investor-state disputes are resolved
along similar lines as international legal disputes in completely different
areas of international law, such as border disputes and continental shelf
disputes.143
of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 283, 300 (2010); Leah D. Harhay,
Investment Arbitration in 2021: A Look to Diversity and Consistency, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 89 (2011); José
E. Alvarez, The Return of the State, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 223, 244 (2011) [hereinafter Alvarez, The
Return of the State].
138
See infra note 139.
139
The proposed response has two prongs. First, it posits that empirically, there are comparatively
limited instances of divergence given that there is no unifying mechanism of results. This rejoinder is
not convincing given its own perceived need for qualification. See SCHILL, supra note 112, at 293.
Further, the frequency of dissent within arbitral circles is notoriously increasing, not decreasing, so
much so that dissenting has itself become a subject of academic study. See, e.g., Albert Jan van den
Berg, Dissenting Opinions by Party-Appointed Arbitrators in Investment Arbitration, in LOOKING TO
THE FUTURE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN (Arsanjani et al. eds., 2010). Second, it
submits that dissent is not premised upon a bilateral rationale but upon a different view of the role of
international investment law as whole. SCHILL, supra note 112, at 356. This rejoinder reveals deep
fissures within the epistemic community upon which the entire regime hypothesis rests. If members of
the epistemic community do not agree as to the principles, norms, and rules applicable to these disputes
but insist on globally different principles, norms, and rules, international investment law is the
battleground of regime conflict rather than the result of regime creation. See supra note 108.
140
See Rao, supra note 35, at 946 (quoting Rosalyn Higgins, Respecting the Sovereign States and
the Running a Tight Courtroom, 50 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 121, 122 (2001)). Former members of the
International Court of Justice frequently sit in ICSID arbitrations, as do human rights lawyers,
international trade lawyers and commercial arbitrators. See generally Goldhaber, supra note 24.
141
The Argentine decisions discussed supra Part III.B.1 are one example of this fact. The
interpretation of the non-precluded measures clause in the U.S.-Argentina BIT, as reflecting the
customary international law standard codified in ILC Draft Article 25 on State Responsibility,
evidences that tribunals (and parties) instinctively view political risk disputes governed by international
law as subject to the same secondary rules as any other area of international law. In the instance of the
Argentine cases, several annulment decisions have noted that the specific wording of the non-precluded
measures clause in question requires a different interpretation. This conclusion, however, precisely
confirms rather than weakens the general point: these committees did not hold that the law of state
responsibility as a general rule does not apply. It would apply if not displaced by express treaty
language. For further discussion, see, for example, Michael D. Nolan & Frédéric G. Sourgens, The
Limits of Discretion? Self-Judging Emergency Clauses in International Investment Agreements, in Y.B.
INT’L INV. L. & POL’Y 362 (Karl Sauvant ed., 2011).
142
See discussion infra Part III.A.
143
See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 1, at 258–72 (noting that “nationalization of foreign property
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Investor-state arbitration descriptively bears none of the hallmarks of
a strong self-contained regime. Divergence of IIA decisions appears to be
a far greater problem than it admits. IIA tribunal members are drawn not
from a specialist field, but instead are generalists. And the practice of IIA
decisions relies heavily on systemic integration, which regime theory
precisely seeks to displace.144 The regime theory is thus left to argue that
an epistemic community of IIA lawyers should exist. Its explanation why
remains outstanding.
That is not to say that IIA disputes do not bear a resemblance to some
of the characteristics of self-contained regimes. The relevance of IIA
awards to the interpretation of an IIA of third parties is in fact critical to the
legal strategy of counsel of both parties and is reflected in the resulting
awards of tribunals in most occasions. An “epistemic community” does
exist. But its ties are not as strong as posited by either the regime or
multilateralization theories. Membership in this epistemic community is
one of many roles held by its members—and in many instances is
comparatively the weaker membership in the context of a potential role
conflict.145 Though tempting, reliance upon a self-contained regime theory
to explain the current role of international law in the resolution of political
risk disputes is inaccurate.146
D. The Critical Knot
The structural problems faced by all three theories addressing the
development of international investment law are reflected in an aporia
regarding general international law.147 Martti Koskenniemi posits that
international law is both over and under-determined because it argues from
mutually incompatible assumptions. Koskenniemi begins his examination
with a dilemma: international law assumes that it can be simultaneously
“concrete” and “normative,” meaning that law is verified “not against some
political principles but by reference to the concrete behaviour, will and

provides a further example” of the constructivist approach taken by the International Court of Justice in
resolving continental shelf delimitation disputes).
144
For examples, see infra notes 185–205.
145
ILC Fragmentation, supra note 114, at 71 n.168 (noting that a clash between special regimes
would “appear as a clash of rationalities” and that “fragmentation of international law would articulate a
rather fundamental aspect of globalized social reality itself—the replacement of territoriality as the
principle of social differentiation by (non-territorial) functionality”); see also Fischer-Lescano &
Teubner, supra note 123, at 1004 (“At core, the fragmentation of global law is not simply about legal
norm collisions or policy-conflicts, but rather has its origin in contradictions between society-wide
institutionalized rationalities, which law cannot solve, but which demand a new legal approach to
colliding norms.”).
146
See, e.g., Rao, supra note 35, at 958–60 (confirming studies that reveal that specialized tribunals
do not deviate in their legal approach from the outlook of other international law courts and tribunals).
147
KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 1.
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interest of States” and remains “opposable to State policy.”148 Following
this dichotomy, Koskenniemi submits that arguments can be “descending”
from “a given normative code which precedes the State and effectively
dictates how a State is allowed to behave,” or “ascending” by attempting to
“construct a normative order on the basis of the ‘factual’ State behaviour,
will and interest.”149 He submits that both patterns are “exhaustive and
mutually exclusive.”150 Koskenniemi argues that international legal
argument (and international legal decisions) includes both assumptions
because it seeks to be both concrete and normative.151 As such, it is
incoherent because “it incorporates contradictory assumptions about what
it is to argue objectively about norms.”152 Using this dichotomy,
Koskenniemi concludes:
In situations of uncertainty (hard cases) we are thrown back into
having to argue both what the law’s content is and why we
consider it binding on the State. To avoid utopianism, we must
establish the law’s content so that it corresponds to concrete State
practice, will and interest. But to avoid apologism, we must
argue that that it binds the State regardless of its behaviour, will
or interest.153
Koskenniemi’s discussion of his aporia in the context of customary
international law captures the disagreement between IIA scholars whether
customary international law exists because it explains their methodological
disconnect of looking principally to state practice or principally to opinio
juris. Customary international law conceptually oscillates between a
psychological element (opinio juris) and a material element (State practice)
in order to suspend customary international law “between the fully
descending (natural law) and the fully ascending (treaty).”154 The IIA
customary international law position focused upon the treaty practice of
states to generalize specific commitments given in a large number of
bilateral agreements, without inquiry as to whether states are legally
148

Id. at 58.
Id. at 59.
150
Id.
151
Id. at 58, 65 (“The dynamics of international legal argument is provided by the contradiction
between the ascending and descending patterns of argument and the inability to prefer either.
Reconciliatory doctrines will reveal themselves as either incoherent or making a silent preference. In
both cases, they remain vulnerable to criticisms from an alternative perspective. . . . Consequently,
doctrine is forced to maintain itself in constant movement from emphasizing concreteness to
emphasizing normativity and vice-versa without being able to establish itself permanently in either
position.”).
152
Id. at 63.
153
Id. at 66.
154
Id. at 410.
149
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obligated to make these commitments.155 It adopts a strategy that, in
Koskenniemi’s words, “tends towards reconciliation by a tacit consent
argument—materializing the psychological element.”156 Inferred tacit
agreement is used to overrule actual objection (in the form of changed
treaty commitments).157 The position falls headlong into utopianism that
property ought to be protected. But this position is true whether or not
there is material state practice supporting it. The customary international
law argument thus is caught in the aporia.
Koskenniemi’s challenge of sovereignty accounts for the difficulties
of the critique of IIAs and arbitral decisions interpreting them. Sovereignty
“oscillates between an ascending and descending perspective on
statehood,” i.e., “[o]ne State argues in terms of effective power” while the
“other argues in a way which assumes the precedence of constraining
norms to actual power.”158 At first, the critique appears to argue from the
sovereignty of the state as effective power to justify the subjection of the
investor to the state’s legislative, regulatory, and executive conduct.159 But
part of the premise of the critique is to curtail the power of multinational
corporations acting independently from their home states.160 It attempts to
resist a perceived change in effective power.161 The constraining factors
relied upon are a right to development and economic self-determination.162
The critical project thus falls into the same utopianism of which it accused
the champions of investment protection. It, too, is caught in the aporia.
Finally, the construction of a specialized regime of international
investment law also does not escape the aporia. Rather, it falls into the
problem Koskenniemi describes in the context of treaty interpretation. It
also oscillates between “a subjective approach [that] treaties bind because
they express consent” (ascending) and an “objective approach” that “they
bind because considerations of teleology, utility, reciprocity, good faith or
155

See supra Part II.A.1.
KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 1, at 427.
157
Id. at 430 (“But to say that material practice creates a presumption about consent does not, by
itself, go far enough to make that practice normative. . . . [I]f we wish to achieve the original aim of
having a custom which binds non-accepting States, too, we must regard the presumption as nonrebuttable.”).
158
Id. at 225, 228.
159
See, e.g., SORNARAJAH, supra note 37, at 388 (“Regulatory functions are a sovereign right of the
host state, and there could be no right in international law to compensation or diplomatic protection in
respect of such interference.”).
160
See supra Part II.B.
161
See, e.g., SORNARAJAH, supra note 37, at 20, 37.
162
Id. at 297 (“Likewise, norms of international law on development will have to be addressed.
Thus, the principle of economic self-determination which in itself is a principle enshrined in the United
Nations Charter and elevated, at least by a group of writers, to a principle of ius cogens in modern
international law.”) The invocation of ius cogens signals a radical departure from the voluntarist
paradigm, as Prosper Weil demonstrates in Towards Relative Normativity in International Law. See
generally Weil, supra note 28.
156
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justice so require.”163 Thus, the key advance of the regime position over
other rival conceptions of IIAs is its acknowledgment of an “objective”
starting point that conditions an essentially teleological interpretation
towards the coherence and convergence of an inherently “neoliberal”
international investment law.164 This move alone, however, “provides no
solution” because we cannot “know which interpretation (which behavior,
which teleology) manifests consents.”165 The objective approach must
itself be justified by consent, i.e., the existence of a relevant epistemic
community.166 This in turn means that the moment the epistemic
community descriptively ceases to exist, so does the objective starting point
of interpretation. Regime theory attempts to avoid this fate by appealing to
the rationality of the regime principles—but this appeal falls into the same
utopianism as the customary international law and critical projects. It, too,
falls prey to the logic of the aporia.
To resolve the theoretical problem of the role international law in
settling investor-state disputes, it is necessary to either resolve or reject
Koskenniemi’s aporia. The theoretical approaches championed so far have
done neither. The remainder of the Article will propose an approach to
resolve the problem by switching points of view from result to process,
from deductive reasoning to inductive reasoning.
III. LAW AS PROCESS—THE PRACTICE OF INVESTOR-STATE
TRIBUNALS
The failure of the three predominant theories for investor-state
arbitration requires a return to the drawing broad. These three competing
conceptions all focused on results—the award in IIA disputes. This focus
reveals a methodological flaw: decisions do not appear ready-made but are
the result of a dispute resolution process. It is this process, rather than the
result to which it leads, that defines the system that these decisions help
form.167 This part explores the process both in instances of affirmative
reliance by tribunals upon earlier decisions and in instances in which
tribunals diverge from earlier relevant decisions.

163

KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 1, at 333.
See supra Part II.C.1.
165
KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 1, at 336.
166
See id. at 333; SALACUSE, LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 108, at 8.
167
See, e.g., Myers McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, The Prescribing Function in World
Constiutive Process: How International Law is Made, 6 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 249 (1979)
(using process to critique natural law and positivist positions to international law).
164
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A. Reliance Upon Earlier Decisions in Investor-State Arbitral
Awards
Express reliance by investor-state tribunals upon decisions rendered
by other international courts and tribunals is ubiquitous. The fact of this
reliance is acknowledged by all three theories,168 and it is increasingly
acknowledged in arbitral decisions themselves.169
Studies of arbitral precedent focus first and foremost on the tribunals’
use of prior decisions.170 This starting point leads to imprecise results
because a tribunal views prior decisions through the lens of the record
created by counsel.171 The first step to understanding the use of prior
decisions by arbitral tribunals is to understand how these decisions are
before those tribunals in the first place: it is taking note of the instrumental
role of counsel in assembling the legal record upon which a tribunal
decides the dispute.
The task of establishing the use of prior decisions by counsel is made

168

See infra note 171.
See Saipem SpA v. Bangl., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 67 (Mar.
21, 2007); Noble Energy Inc. & MachalaPower Cia Ltd. v. Ecuador & Consejo Nacional de
Electricidad, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/12, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 50 (Mar. 5, 2008); Duke Energy
Electroquil Partners & Electroquil S.A. v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19, Award, ¶¶ 116–117,
(Aug. 12, 2008); Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret ve Sanayi A.Ş. v. Pak., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29,
Award, ¶ 145 (Aug. 24, 2009); Austrian Airlines v. Slovk., Final Award, ¶¶ 83–84 (Oct. 9, 2009),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0048.pdf; Chemtura Corp. v. Can., Award,
¶¶ 108–109 (Aug. 2, 2010), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0149_0.pdf;
Abaclat v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 293 (Aug. 4, 2011); Daimler
Fin. Servs. AG v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, Award, n.588 (Aug. 22, 2012); Chevron Corp. &
Texaco Petroleum Co. v. Ecuador, Interim Award, ¶ 121 (Dec. 1, 2008), http://www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0150.pdf; see also Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. Mex.,
Separate Opinion of Prof. Thomas Wälde, ¶ 129 (Jan. 26, 2006), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/
case-documents/ita0432.pdf; Canadian Cattlemen for Fair Trade v. U.S., Award on Jurisdiction, ¶ 50
(Jan. 28, 2008), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0114.pdf; Suez v. Arg.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on Liability, ¶ 182 (July 30, 2010).
170
See, e.g., SALACUSE, LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 108, at 155 (“[I]n applying
international law, international courts and tribunals may refer to previous judicial decisions and arbitral
decisions to determine the applicable rules of international law.”); see also Andrea K. Bjorklund,
Mandatory Rules of Law and Investment Arbitration, 18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 175, 185–86 (2007);
Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Emerging Civilization of Investment Arbitration, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1269,
1294–97 (2009) [hereinafter Bjorklund, Emerging Civilization] (quoting Christoph Schreuer, Diversity
and Harmonization of Treaty Interpretation in Investment Arbitration, 3 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 10
(Apr. 2006)).
171
David A. Gantz, The Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions: From NAFTA to the United
States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 679, 689 (2004) (“Given the common
practice of both private investors and governments in citing prior investment tribunal decisions that
appear to favor them, it is inevitable that ICSID and other tribunals interpreting similar provisions of
these BITs will consider and sometimes follow the NAFTA cases.”); Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis,
supra note 17, at 1612 (endorsing David Gantz’s analysis); see also SALACUSE, LAW OF INVESTMENT
TREATIES, supra note 108, at 155.
169
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difficult by the privacy of arbitral proceedings. Most briefing is not
publicly available. Counsels’ pleading of cases must therefore be inferred
from the awards’ recitation of arguments.172 The recitations frequently
obscure the use of authorities by counsel. In many instances, it is
impossible to recreate it.173
Available evidence shows that counsel have two principal goals when
relying upon jurisprudence. First, counsel’s “central contribution lies in
finding the place where the facts and the law intersect to yield the outcome
sought by the client in the arbitration.”174 This contribution requires that
counsel find analogous cases that make record facts relevant to the legal
claim or defense advanced. This use of decisions by counsel focuses
principally on the conduct of the parties and supports how the parties’
behavior produces a normative result.175
It is unsurprising that counsel would and do rely upon prior BIT
determinations that address the same underlying conduct of the respondent
state, if such determinations are available.176 These decisions are most
directly relevant to the dispute at bar. Counsel next draw upon decisions
172

The problem created by the relative dearth of such material was noted for example by Professor
Strong in the context of international commercial arbitration. See S. I. Strong, Research in
International Commercial Arbitration: Special Skills, Special Sources, 20 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 119,
128 (2009) (“Thus, historically speaking, outsiders operated under a double handicap, not only lacking
the reference materials from which to craft their legal arguments but also lacking the specialized knowhow on how to conduct their research.”); see also James E. Castello, Report on the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Working Group, 63 JUL- DISP. RESOL. J. 7 (2008) (noting that “NGOs proposed adding the
following rules for investor-State arbitrations that arise under a multilateral treaty or BIT: (1) require
UNCITRAL to publish all pleadings (subject to limited redactions) and all awards; (2) open all hearings
to the public; and (3) authorize tribunals to accept submissions from amici curiae”). The most notable
exception to this general rule is that pleadings in NAFTA cases are generally available. In addition,
some other materials are known to counsel in investor-state arbitrations, their legal experts, and—
obviously—arbitrators. The conclusions gleaned below from specific summaries in arbitral awards are
consistent with the author’s experience as a participant in investor-state arbitrations.
173
For 2012 decisions that do not recite the use of authorities by counsel in the merits context, see
Bosh Int’l, Inc. & B&P Ltd. Foreign Inv. Enter. v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/11, Award (Oct. 22,
2012); Iberdrola Energía S.A. v. Guat., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/5, Award (Aug. 17, 2012); Swisslion
Doo Skorpe v. Maced., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/16, Award (July 6, 2012).
174
GUILLERMO AGUILAR ALVAREZ, Effective Written Advocacy, in THE ART OF ADVOCACY IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 195, 203 (R. Doak Bishop & Edward G. Kehoe eds., 2d ed. 2010).
175
See, e.g., Paushok et al. v. Mong., Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶¶ 226–229, 302, 305
(Apr. 28, 2011), http://italaw.com/documents/PaushokAward.pdf.
176
See, e.g., Sempra Energy Int’l v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶¶ 273–274, 346,
376 (Sept. 18, 2007) (recounting significant discussion by the parties of the earlier CMS v. Argentina
and Enron v. Argentina decisions addressing liability of Argentina arising out of its response to the
2001 financial crisis similarly at issue in the Sempra arbitration); Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 192 n.259 (Sept. 5, 2008) (recounting significant reliance by the claimant
upon the earlier Enron v. Argentina decision); see also Quasar de Valores SICA SA v. Russian Fed’n,
SCC Case No. 24/2007, Award, ¶¶ 18, 59 (July 20, 2012) (recounting significant reliance by the
claimant on the earlier RosInvest v. Russia award on the merits addressing the Russian Federation’s
treatment of Yukos Oil Company similarly at issue in Quasar de Valores).
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addressing a specific industry in the host country.177 Finally, counsel
submit decisions addressing measures by other host governments that are
materially similar to the measures at bar.178
Counsel also seek to distinguish the decisions relied upon by their
adversaries. Distinctions of prior decisions seek to distance the problem at
bar from the problem in the case relied upon by opposing counsel.179 Such
distinctions frequently are factual, i.e., they point to a record fact that
materially changes the problem of the case at bar from the one decided
previously.180 In other instances, they seek to point to a difference in the
177

See, e.g., Ulysseas, Inc. v. Ecuador, Final Award, ¶ 224 (June 12, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1019.pdf (“In short, Respondent concludes that Claimant had no
legitimate expectation that it would be guaranteed market, profitability, price or collection of payments.
In Respondent’s view, the reasoning in Duke v. Ecuador should thus apply here as well.”); see also id.
¶ 160 (“Claimant refers to Noble Energy Inc. v. Ecuador, in which it was recorded that the generator
was not operating at a profit, and to Mr. Veldwijk’s report, in which he states that he was receiving
similar information in relation to Termoguayas. Claimant also cites Duke v. Ecuador and Noble v.
Ecuador, where the claimants, who had entered into contracts with Ecuador, struggled to obtain any
collections.”).
178
See, e.g., Paushok et al. v. Mong., Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶ 268 (Apr. 28, 2011),
http://italaw.com/documents/PaushokAward.pdf (defending against claims that the manner of passage
of a law through the Mongolian parliament violated the Mongolia Russian Federation BIT,
“Respondent submits that legislative processes are not within the scope of any transparency conception
as discussed by the international investment tribunals”); Romak S.A. v. Uzb., PCA Case No. AA280,
Award, ¶ 136 (Nov. 26, 2009) (“Romak draws support from the recent award in Rumeli Telekom A.S.
and Telsim Mobil Telekomunikasyon Hizmetleri A.S. v. Kazakhstan, arguing that ‘a taking by the
judicial arm of the State may also amount to an expropriation.’ Further, relying on Saipem v.
Bangladesh, Romak argues that the courts’ refusal to enforce the GAFTA Award has destroyed
Romak’s rights and the commercial value of its investment, and therefore constitutes expropriation.”);
Cargill Inc. v. Mex., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, Award, ¶ 256 (Aug. 13, 2009) (“Claimant asserts
that these actions were inconsistent as they constituted a dramatic shift from Respondent’s initial
equivalent tax treatment of sugar and HFCS. Claimant quotes the tribunal’s holding in GAMI for
support of its position: ‘The imposition of a new license requirement may for example be viewed quite
differently if it appears on a blank slate or if it is an arbitrary repudiation of a preexisting licensing
regime upon which a foreign investor has demonstrably relied.’”).
179
See, e.g., Kevin H. Smith, Practical Jurisprudence: Deconstructing and Synthesizing the Art
and Science of Thinking Like a Lawyer, 29 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 16 (1998) (“Successful legal research
and analysis depends upon the ability to locate cases that a court would find factually analogous and to
distinguish cases that a court would find factually dissimilar. The ability to accurately assess those
cases that a court would or would not find analogous promotes the accuracy of your prediction
concerning: (a) the legal issue(s) raised by Able’s fact scenario; (b) the selection, interpretation, and
statement of the applicable rules of law; and (c) the legal conclusions that result from the application of
the rules to the facts.”).
180
Although party argument is not recounted, the difference of opinion between the majority and
dissent in the recent Abaclat award reveals how such distinctions are drawn by counsel in investor-state
arbitrations. See Abaclat v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Dissent of Prof. Abi-Saab, ¶¶ 101, 105
(Oct. 28, 2011) (“Fedax is an isolated case. It is an outlier. But I need not expand further on whether it
was correctly decided or not, as it is clearly distinguishable in this respect (of territorial link) from the
present case on facts”); see also Daimler Fin. Servs. AG v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, Award,
¶ 63 (Aug. 22, 2012) (“absence of a contract between the disputing parties distinguishes the present
case from other investor-State cases in which tribunals have had to grapple with whether the presence
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legal instrument governing the dispute at bar that would materially alter the
outcome of a prior, factually analogous dispute.181
Importantly, counsel do not limit themselves to BIT disputes to set the
frame of facts for which an interpretation of the applicable instrument
ultimately must account. Rather, cases have relied upon human rights
adjudications,182 WTO determinations,183 and judgments from the
International Court of Justice, to name but a few.184
The decision in Paushok et al. v. Mongolia illustrates this style of
argument and how tribunals rely upon in drafting the ultimate awards of
investor-state tribunals. In Paushok, Mongolia argued that the foreign gold
miner could not claim that a 68% windfall profits tax imposed on revenue
above a price of $500 an ounce on sale of gold violated a bilateral
investment treaty because of the gold miner’s conduct.185 The gold miner
upon appropriate due diligence would have had an opportunity to avoid the
risk of taxation by entering into a stability agreement with the Mongolian
government, but failed to do so.186 Mongolia relied upon several prior
decisions that similarly declined liability when the investor failed to
conclude a stability agreement.187 The Paushok tribunal ultimately
followed this line of argument in its award, focusing on this fact as critical
to its interpretation of the treaty’s mandate that Mongolia accord Russian
investments fair and equitable treatment.188
Paushok further evidences the use of non-BIT sources to frame the
legally relevant facts for which an interpretation of an IIA has to account.
For instance, Mongolia submitted that the relevant facts to establish
of a forum selection clause within a specific investment or concession agreement could ‘oust’ the
jurisdiction of a BIT-based arbitral tribunal with respect to claims concerning violations of the
contractual agreement”); Occidental Petrol. Corp. & Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Ecuador,
ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Award, ¶ 418 (Sept. 24, 2012).
181
See discussion of NAFTA cases regarding the scope of fair and equitable treatment infra.
182
See, e.g., Quasar de Valores SICA SA v. Russian Fed’n, SCC Case No. 24/2007, Award, ¶ 13
(July 20, 2012) (Respondents relied upon ECHR decision in its favor in Yukos v. Russia with regard to
part of the factual allegations raised by the claimants in the arbitration).
183
See, e.g., Continental Cas. Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 192 (Sept. 5, 2008)
(relying upon WTO-GATT case law “which has extensively dealt with the concept and requirements of
necessity in the context of economic measures derogating to the obligations contained in GATT”).
184
Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, ¶¶ 175–176 (Oct. 5, 2005)
(relying upon the ICJ ELSI case in order to determine legal standard applicable to state conduct towards
insolvent companies, an issue in common in both cases).
185
See, e.g., Paushok et al. v. Mong., Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶¶ 226–229 (Apr. 28,
2011), http://italaw.com/documents/PaushokAward.pdf.
186
Id.; Paushok v. Mong., Mongolia’s Rejoinder Pleading, ¶¶ 49–51 (Feb. 20, 2009) (on file with
the author).
187
Paushok v. Mong., Mongolia’s Rejoinder Pleading, ¶¶ 49–51 (Feb. 20, 2009) (on file with the
author); see also Paushok et al. v. Mong., Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶¶ 226–229 (Apr. 28,
2011), http://italaw.com/documents/PaushokAward.pdf.
188
Paushok et al. v. Mong., Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶¶ 302, 305 (Apr. 28, 2011),
http://italaw.com/documents/PaushokAward.pdf.
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whether Mongolia discriminated against the Russian gold miner were
limited to examination of treatment extended to competitive and
substitutable goods (i.e., other gold miners) rather than permitting a crosssectoral analysis of the treatment of oil and gas companies.189 Mongolia
relied upon WTO jurisprudence for this delimitation of legally relevant
facts.190 The tribunal followed the WTO approach.191
Second, counsel relies upon jurisprudence as support for their reading
of a bilateral or multilateral investment treaty. This use is the most
prevalent when prior decisions are sharply divided over their interpretations
of facially similar treaty language or the content of customary international
law. The most heavily litigated issues falling within this second category
are the meaning of so-called umbrella clauses requiring host states to
observe any obligation they have assumed with regard to specific
investments in its territory by investors of the other contracting party.192
Further, the content of the so-called customary international law minimum
standard of treatment particularly in the context of NAFTA has led to sharp
disagreements.193 Another frequently litigated issue concerns the scope of
non-precluded measures clauses and the defense of necessity under
customary international law.194 Counsel addressing claims involving these
issues as a general rule submit and discuss the canon of decisions favoring
their interpretations and refine that jurisprudence to improve their odds of
persuading their respective tribunals.195

189

Id. ¶ 266.
Id.
191
Id. ¶ 315 (“The Tribunal is of the view that, before concluding to discrimination in the present
case, the sectors covered should relate to competitive and substitutable products, an expression
regularly used in WTO/GATT cases. In doing so, the Tribunal is aware of the differences between the
Treaty and the one governing the WTO. It merely states that such a requirement is a reasonable one to
apply when considering allegations of discrimination.”). The question thus was one of delimitation of
legally relevant facts for interpretation rather than of interpretation of the treaty in and of itself.
192
For a discussion of umbrella clause disputes, and divergent interpretations of different umbrella
clauses, see, for example, Stephan W. Schill, Enabling Private Ordering: Function, Scope and Effect of
Umbrella Clauses in International Investment Treaties, 18 MIN. J. INT’L L. 1, 93–94 (2009) (submitting
that the function of umbrella clauses “consists in opening recourse to an international dispute settlement
forum in order to enable investors to enforce contractual and quasi-contractual promises made by the
host State and to counter opportunistic behavior of the host State that can undermine the initially-struck
bargain, independent of whether the host State’s breach was based on commercial or sovereign
conduct”); see also Wong, supra note 82, at 135.
193
For a recent discussion, see generally Margaret Clare Ryan, Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. The United
States and the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, 56 MCGILL L.J. 919 (2011) (critiquing the
doctrinal approach of the Glamis Gold tribunal).
194
For a discussion, see, for example, Nolan & Sourgens, supra note 141, at 362. See also William
W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in Extraordinary Times: The
Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties,
48 VA. J. INT’L L. 307 (2008).
195
See, e.g., SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of Para., ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/29, Award, ¶ 83 (Feb. 10, 2012) (“Respondent cites a string of cases including Siemens v.
190
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Counsel again draw heavily on jurisprudence from the International
Court of Justice and the Permanent Court of International Justice.196 They
have pointed tribunals to decisions by human rights bodies.197 They have
argued from WTO decisions.198 They have submitted awards from
tribunals hearing purely contractual claims from investors against host
states or their instrumentalities.199 They have even relied upon awards
arising out of disputes between political risk insurers and insureds.200
These invocations of non-BIT sources are frequently successful.
Prior theories dealing with case law through the lens of tribunal
practice (rather than the use of jurisprudence by counsel) captures the
second element only. The use of cases to set the framework for
interpretation of relevant legal instruments goes largely unnoticed.201 As
discussed below, it is this first aspect of problem-setting that ultimately
helps to explain the role of international law in the resolution of investorstate disputes without running into the traps encountered by the currently

Argentina, Bayindir v. Pakistan, RFCC v. Morocco, Waste Management v. Mexico, Impregilo v.
Pakistan and Duke v. Ecuador for the proposition that a government’s breach of contract can only rise
to the level of a breach of the BIT if it involved an abuse of sovereign authority.”); Mobil Investments
Canada Inc. & Murphy Oil Corp. v. Can., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/4, Decision on Liability and on
Principles of Quantum, ¶¶ 113, 126 (May 22, 2012) (“Claimant’s principally rely on Medioambientales
Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, and Metalclad Corporation v. Mexico. (On the standard
applicable under Article 1105, the Respondent relies in particular on the decisions in Glamis Gold, Ltd.
v. U.S. and Cargill, Incorporated v. United Mexican States to the effect that the customary international
law standard ‘has not evolved from the ‘shocking and egregious’ standard described in Neer’ but that
‘what is ‘egregious and shocking’ has developed since 1926.’”)).
196
See, e.g., Kardassopoulos v. Republic of Geor., ICSID Case Nos. ARB/05/18 & ARB/07/15,
Award, ¶¶ 487–488 (Feb. 28, 2010) (Claimant relying upon the PCIJ Case concerning the Factory at
Chorzów for principle of full compensation for losses); Azurix Corp v. Arg., ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/12, Award, ¶ 387 (June 23, 2006) (Respondent relying upon the ICJ ELSI case for definition of
arbitrary treatment standard).
197
See, e.g., Roussalis v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, Award, ¶¶ 131–137 (Dec. 7, 2011)
(Claimant relying upon the ECHR decisions in Maşinexportimport Industrial Group S.A. v. Romania
and Riabykh v. Russia in support of a BIT expropriation claim that “proceedings initiated by
Respondent have deprived the investor of the use of his ownership by creating juridical insecurity
through a breach of the principle of legal certainty”); see also Commission, supra note 3, at 152
(collecting citations to non-ICSID decisions by investor-state tribunals).
198
See, e.g., Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 85 (Sept. 5, 2008)
(“Argentina submits that the term ‘necessary’ contained in Art. XI of the BIT must be interpreted in line
with the GATT-WTO case-law, under which ‘necessary’ is not synonymous of ‘indispensable.’”); see
also Commission, supra note 3, at 152.
199
ICS Inspection and Control Services Ltd. v. Arg., PCA Case No. 2010-9, Award on Jurisdiction,
¶ 145 (Feb. 10, 2012) (Respondent relying upon Saudi Arabia v. ARAMCO and Texaco v. Libya).
200
El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award, ¶ 165 (Oct. 27, 2011)
(Respondent relying upon arbitration between Revere Copper and the U.S. political risk insurer OPIC);
Telenor Mobile Commc’ns A.S. v. Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/04/15, Award, ¶ 69 (June 22, 2006)
(Claimant relying upon the Revere Copper decision).
201
See SCHILL, supra note 112, at 347–50 (noting the practice of tribunals (rather than counsel)
distinguishing prior awards on the facts).
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predominant theories.202
B. Divergence of Investor-State Arbitral Awards
As discussed above, investor-state arbitral decisions have diverged—
and continue to diverge—both on their interpretation of legal standards and
their appreciation of facts.203 Divergence can be better explained from the
point of view of process than from the point of view of results. What
appears as divergence of results is, in fact, the reasonable outcome of a
different understanding by the tribunals in question of what constitutes the
legal problems put before them by the parties.
This part will use the process lens to examine apparent divergence
with regard to the two most recent, and potentially serious, instances of
divergence. They are (1) decisions interpreting Argentina’s invocation of a
state of emergency in proceedings relating to measures adopted after the
2001 financial crisis, and (2) the interpretation of Article 1105 of NAFTA.
1. The Argentine Cases
The 2001 Argentine financial crisis led a multiplicity of legal
proceedings arising out of the same government measures under the same
underlying bilateral investment treaties.204 In all of these proceedings,
Argentina pled that the economic emergency brought upon it by the 2001
financial crisis precluded or excused its treaty liability.205 The most notable
divergences between tribunals arose with regard to the interpretation and
application of the non-precluded measures clause in the US-Argentina BIT.
The clause states the following with deceiving simplicity:

202

See infra Part IV.
See supra Part III.A.
204
CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award (Apr. 25, 2005); LG&E
Energy Corp. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability (Oct. 3, 2006); Sempra Energy
Int’l v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award (Sept. 18, 2007); Enron Corp. & Ponderosa Assets,
L.P. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award (May 22, 2007); Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/9, Award (Sept. 5, 2008); El Paso Energy Int’l Col. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15,
Award (Oct. 27, 2011); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision of
the Ad Hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic (Aug. 21, 2007);
Sempra Energy Int’l v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Decision on the Argentine Republic’s
Request for Annulment of the Award (June 10, 2010); Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. & Ponderosa
Assets, L.P. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on the Application for Annulment of the
Argentine Republic (July 30, 2010).
205
For an overview of the events leading up to the financial crisis and the immediate response
thereto, see J. F. Hornbeck, The Argentine Financial Crisis: A Chronology of Events, U.S. DEPT. OF
STATE: FOREIGN PRESS CENTER, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/8040.pdf (last visited Jan.
24, 2013).
203
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This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of
measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the
fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or
restoration of international peace or security, or the Protection of
its own essential security interests.206
The majority of decisions concluded that Argentina could not invoke
the non-precluded measures clause because Argentina did not meet the
customary international law definition of necessity.207 The decisions in
LG&E and Continental Casualty differed, as did the annulment committees
in CMS and Sempra.208
The decisions had different results for two reasons, both of which
arise in the specific records before the respective tribunals: (1) significant
changes in strategy by Argentina, and (2) diverging views on how
systemically to integrate customary international law in the interpretation
of the non-precluded measures clause. These differences do not reveal the
emergence of, or threat to, a consistent legal standard in investor-state
decisions. Instead, they reveal the importance of the “input” for the
decision-making process of investor-state arbitrations. Rather than speak
to systemic legitimacy, they stand for the unremarkable proposition that
counsel’s litigation strategy can and does affect the outcome of litigation.
a. Introduction of New Theories
The Continental Casualty Company v. Argentina decision is the only
award (as opposed to annulment decision) to reject the legal paradigm
adopted by all prior awards. All prior awards concluded that Article XI of
the U.S.-Argentina BIT adopted the customary international law defense of
necessity.209 The Continental Casualty tribunal did not follow earlier BIT
206

Treaty Between United States of America and the Argentine Republic Concerning the
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, art. XI, Nov. 14, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 124,
amended by S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-2 (1993), available at http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/
All_Trade_Agreements/exp_000897.asp (last visited Jan. 24, 2013).
207
CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award (Apr. 25, 2005);
Sempra Energy Int’l v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award (Sept. 18, 2007); Enron Corp. &
Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award (May 22, 2007); El Paso Energy
Int’l Col. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award (Oct. 27, 2011).
208
LG&E Energy Corp. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, ¶¶ 213–242
(Oct. 3, 2006); Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶¶ 196–236 (Sept. 5, 2008);
CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee on
the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic (Aug. 21, 2007); Sempra Energy Int’l v. Arg.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Decision on the Argentine Republic’s Request for Annulment of the
Award, ¶ 199 (June 10, 2010).
209
This paradigm was later rejected in several annulment decisions discussed infra. It is
noteworthy that these annulment decisions are fundamentally inconsistent with the arbitral records
before the tribunals reaching contrary decisions.
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decisions. Instead, it concluded the following:
[T]he text of Art. XI derives from the parallel model clause of the
U.S. FCN treaties and these treaties in turn reflect the
formulation of Art. XX of GATT 1947, the Tribunal finds it
more appropriate to refer to the GATT and WTO case law which
has extensively dealt with the concept and requirements of
necessity in the context of economic measures derogating to the
obligations contained in GATT, rather than to refer to the
requirement of necessity under customary international law.210
Premised upon the WTO understanding of necessity, the tribunal concluded
that Argentina could invoke Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT with
respect to the Corralito (bank freeze), the devaluation of the peso, and the
pesification of U.S. dollar denominated contracts and deposits. 211
The difference in approaches between Continental Casualty and the
other Argentine cases arises directly out of the specific records of these
cases.
The Continental Casualty tribunal endorsed and adopted
Argentina’s litigation position in that proceeding; as the Award records,
“Argentina submits that the term ‘necessary’ contained in Art. XI of the
BIT must be interpreted in line with the GATT-WTO case-law.”212 The
distinction between the conception of necessity in customary international
law and in GATT-WTO case law is not commented upon in CMS v.
Argentina,213 Sempra v. Argentina,214 Enron v. Argentina,215 or the 2011
decision in El Paso v. Argentina.216 Argentina’s arguments raised during
the later annulment stage strongly suggest that the distinction simply was

210

Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 192 (Sept. 5, 2008). For a
discussion of the WTO standard of necessity under Article XX of GATT 1947, see generally Dapo
Akande & Sope Williams, International Adjudication on National Security Issues: What Role for the
WTO, 43 VIRG. J. INT’L L. 365 (2002); Wesley A. Cann, Creating Standards and Accountability for the
Use of the WTO Security Exception: Reducing the Role of Power-Based Relations and Establishing a
New Balance Between Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 413 (2001); Raj Bhala,
National Security and International Trade Law: What the GATT Says, and What the United States
Does, 19 PENN. J. INT’L ECON. L. 263 (1998).
211
Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶¶ 196–236 (Sept. 5, 2008),
212
Id. ¶ 85 (citing Argentina’s Rejoinder, ¶¶ 409–419).
213
CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ¶¶ 368–371 (Apr. 25,
2005) (discussing GATT Article XXI only to contrast the wording of that clause for purposes of
analyzing whether Article XI of the US-Argentina BIT was self-judging).
214
Sempra Energy Int’l v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶¶ 369, 383–385 (Sept. 18,
2007) (same as CMS Gas award).
215
Enron Corp. & Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, ¶ 336 (May
22, 2007) (same as CMS Gas award).
216
El Paso Energy Int’l Col. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award (Oct. 27, 2011) (same as
CMS Gas). The hearing on the merits in El Paso predates issuance of the Continental Casualty award.
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not pled in the earlier proceedings.217
Approaching the substantive difference in outcome and legal
reasoning in Continental Casualty from those in the earlier Argentine
decisions from the point of process overcomes the apparent divergence
problem. From the point of view of legal process, comparing the
Continental Casualty award and other Argentine decisions is to compare
apples to oranges because of the fundamentally different approaches taken
in these cases. It is simply meaningless to speak of “divergence” between
these decisions because they lack a common procedural denominator.
b. Difference in Factual Findings
This leaves the inconsistent result reached by the LG&E tribunal, but
this inconsistency was not caused by the adoption of a different legal
framework.218 Rather, it follows from different factual findings made by
the LG&E tribunal compared to other Argentine tribunals. As the decision
prominently notes:
The entire healthcare system teetered on the brink of collapse.
Prices of pharmaceuticals soared as the country plunged deeper
into the deflationary period, becoming unavailable for lowincome people. Hospitals suffered a severe shortage of basic
supplies. Investments in infrastructure and equipment for public
hospitals declined as never before. These conditions prompted
the Government to declare the nationwide health emergency to
ensure the population’s access to basic health care goods and
services. At the time, one quarter of the population could not
afford the minimum amount of food required to ensure their
subsistence. Given the level of poverty and lack of access to
healthcare and proper nutrition, disease followed.219
This evidence is not commented upon in any of the other Argentine
decisions.220
217
See CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision of the Ad Hoc
Committee on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic, ¶¶ 123–127 (Aug. 21, 2007)
(discussing the framework in which the parties pled the Article XI defense); Enron Creditors Recovery
Corp. & Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on the Application for
Annulment of the Argentine Republic, ¶ 353 (July 30, 2010) (not raising as one of the annulment
arguments that the tribunal failed to state reasons that the tribunal did not address an argument that
Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT followed the approach of GATT 1947 Article XX); Sempra
Energy Int’l v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Decision on the Argentine Republic’s Request for
Annulment of the Award, ¶ 132 (June 10, 2010) (same as Enron annulment).
218
LG&E Energy Corp. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, ¶ 261 (Oct. 3, 2006).
219
Id. ¶ 234.
220
See supra note 204.
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Again the process point of view avoids the divergence problem. The
LG&E tribunal either differed in its appreciation of the factual evidence, or
it was faced with different pieces of factual evidence altogether. It is to be
expected that different tribunals would come to different evidentiary
conclusions. To ascribe such differences to “divergence” is precisely not to
understand that arbitral tribunals have a legal duty of independence in
finding the facts upon which their resolution of the dispute hinges.221
c. Divergence in Integration
The coherence and legitimacy of investor-state arbitrations has also
been called into question by reference to three annulment decisions reached
in arbitration arising out of the Argentine financial crisis.222 The annulment
committees in CMS and Sempra concluded that the U.S.-Argentina BIT did
not integrate the customary international law defense of necessity but
created a wholly independent defense.223 The annulment committee in
Enron further faulted the tribunal for its failure to press the parties for
further evidence in order to establish whether there was an underlying state
of necessity.224 These decisions evidence a fundamental breakdown in the
ICSID control mechanism.225 They do not, however, demonstrate a need
for either greater convergence in arbitral determinations or a symptom of a
larger legitimacy crisis.
To speak of divergence again is senseless from a process perspective.
As a matter of the arbitral record, the annulment committees in question did
not disagree with the tribunals’ treatment of arguments or evidence actually
presented to them.226 Rather, the annulment determinations turned on
positions that Argentina contradicted in the arbitral proceedings prior to the
annulment stage, namely that Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT should
not be interpreted from the starting point of customary international law.227
221

NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 385 (5th
ed. 2009) (“[F]act-finding is one of the most significant functions of an arbitral tribunal, and it is a
function that all tribunals take seriously.”).
222
Alvarez, The Return of the State, supra note 137, at 244; Burke-White & von Staden, supra note
137, at 300; Harhay, supra note 137, at 89.
223
CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision of the Ad Hoc
Committee on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic, ¶ 130 (Aug. 21, 2007);
Sempra Energy Int’l v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Decision on the Argentine Republic’s
Request for Annulment of the Award, ¶ 198 (June 10, 2010).
224
Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. & Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3,
Decision on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic, ¶ 392 (July 30, 2010).
225
For further discussion, see Frédéric G. Sourgens, Whose Power Is It Anyway? An Assessment of
Article 52(1)(b) of The ICSID Convention (forthcoming).
226
Id.
227
See CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision of the Ad Hoc
Committee on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic, ¶ 123 (Aug. 21, 2007)
(“Argentina took the same approach, conflating ‘state of emergency’ and ‘state of necessity’ and adding
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Given this procedural posture, it would not have been possible for the
arbitral tribunals hearing the original claims to rule in the manner suggested
by the annulment committees without depriving the claimants of due
process of law.228 The disagreement between the awards and annulment
decisions arises again only by the comparison of apples to oranges.
The question whether Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT
incorporates customary international law, as the majority of awards
concluded, WTO law, as the Continental Casualty tribunal concluded, or
an entirely independent defense, as several annulment decisions suggest,
cannot be answered by a tribunal as an abstract legal proposition.229 As the
recent El Paso tribunal explains, the preference for systemic integration
reflected in Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT) justifies reliance upon customary international law in interpreting
the term “necessary” in Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.230 But as the
Continental Casualty award shows, this preference for systemic integration
does not explain what legal rules to integrate, e.g., customary international
law of necessity or GATT 1947 Article XX.231 This issue requires a
tribunal to make determinations of law and record facts. The factual
component in particular means that a tribunal cannot do so outside of the
specific record with which it is being presented by the parties.
2. The NAFTA Cases
NAFTA Article 1105 requires each party to “accord to investments of
investors of another Party treatment in accordance with international law,
including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.”232
The scope of the obligation in this treaty provision has led to significant
divergence between NAFTA arbitral tribunals. The most recent iteration of
this divergence arises out of the different yardstick set by the Glamis Gold
v. U.S. and Merrill & Ring Forestry v. Canada decisions.233
Current NAFTA jurisprudence unfolds against the background of an
interpretive note, issued by the NAFTA treaty parties in reaction to earlier
NAFTA jurisprudence. In response to early NAFTA jurisprudence, the
NAFTA treaty parties agreed that “[t]he concepts of ‘fair and equitable
that state of necessity is included in Article XI.”).
228
See Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/25, Annulment, ¶¶ 197–247 (Dec. 17, 2010).
229
See supra notes 211–219.
230
El Paso Energy Int’l Col. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award (Oct. 27, 2011).
231
Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶¶ 196–236 (Sept. 5, 2008).
232
North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1105, Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat.
2057, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993).
233
Glamis Gold Ltd. v. U.S., Award (May 14, 2009), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0378.pdf; Merrill & Ring Forestry, L.P. v. Can., Award (Mar. 31, 2010), http://italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0504.pdf.
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treatment’ and ‘full protection and security’ do not require treatment in
addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary international
law minimum standard of treatment of aliens.”234
The Glamis tribunal determined “the treatment of an alien, in order to
constitute an international delinquency, should amount to an outrage, to
bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental
action so far short of international standards that every reasonable and
impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency.”235 It thereby
adopted the standard adopted in the Neer case.236 Glamis established this
standard on the basis of the pleadings of the U.S. (in Glamis itself),237 as
well as legal pleadings of Mexico and Canada in prior NAFTA
proceedings.238 The tribunal looked to state practice of the three NAFTA
member states,239 and held that what constitutes egregious behavior on the
part of states evolves over time.240 The tribunal determined that at the
current point in time, “legitimate expectations relate to an examination
under Article 1105(1) in such situations ‘where a Contracting Party’s
conduct creates reasonable and justifiable expectations on the part of an
investor (or investment) to act in reliance on said conduct. . . .’ [i.e.,] a
State may be tied to the objective expectations that it creates in order to
induce investment.”241
The Merrill & Ring Forestry tribunal disagreed with the Glamis
approach and rejected anchoring the minimum standard of treatment in the
Neer decision:242

234
NAFTA FREE TRADE COMMISSION, NOTES OF INTERPRETATION OF CERTAIN CHAPTER 11
PROVISIONS, § B (July 31, 2001), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/nafta/chap11interp.pdf;
see also Charles H. Brower, II, Why the FTC Notes of Interpretation Constitute a Partial Amendment of
NAFTA Article 1105, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 347 (2006).
235
Glamis Gold Ltd. v. U.S., Award, ¶ 612 (May 14, 2009), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
case-documents/ita0378.pdf (internal quotation marks omitted).
236
Id.
237
Id. ¶ 21 (“In the case of the customary international law standard of ‘fair and equitable
treatment,’ the Parties in this case and the other two NAFTA State Parties agree that the customary
international law standard is at least that set forth in the 1926 Neer arbitration.”).
238
Id. ¶ 612 n.1257.
239
This approach to custom satisfies the classicist view of customary international law in as much
as it relies upon government statements reflecting express opinio juris. The problem remains that the
statements were made in a capacity as defendant in a legal proceeding and as such is not fairly to be
viewed as the unbiased expression of the state’s view of its legal obligations. See Roberts, Traditional
and Modern Approaches, supra note 29. For a discussion of the role of customary international law in
international investment protection, see supra Part II.A.
240
Glamis Gold Ltd. v. U.S., Award, ¶ 613 (May 14, 2009), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
case-documents/ita0378.pdf.
241
Id. ¶ 621.
242
Merrill & Ring Forestry, L.P. v. Can., Award, ¶ 204 (Mar. 31, 2010), http://italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/ita0504.pdf.
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State practice was even less supportive of the standard referred to
in the Neer case. And in the absence of a widespread and
consistent state practice in support of a rule of customary
international law there is no opinio juris either. No general rule
of customary international law can thus be found which applies
the Neer standard, beyond the strict confines of personal safety,
denial of justice and due process.243
The tribunal expressly expanded the scope of Article 1105 of NAFTA
beyond customary international law to include “general principles of law”
as well.244 It noted that “[g]ood faith and the prohibition of arbitrariness
are no doubt an expression of such general principles[.]”245 The Merrill &
Ring Forestry tribunal thus anchored the fair and equitable treatment
provision in a general duty of reasonableness.246
Again, the records in Glamis and Merrill & Ring Forestry are
instructive. Glamis argued that a “lack of ‘transparency and candour in an
administrative process’” violated the fair and equitable treatment standard
by failing to accord Glamis due process.247 It is in this context that Glamis
submitted (unsuccessfully) that the fair and equitable treatment standard
required a showing of unreasonableness, unfairness, or injustice rather than
egregiousness, outrage, or shock.248 The principal evidence of state
practice relied upon by Glamis was the submission of the U.S. in the ICJ
dispute in the ELSI case between the U.S. and Italy.249 In addition, Glamis
submitted that “BITs are reflective of the customary international law
standard of treatment owed to foreign investors,” meaning that the
interpretation of other fair and equitable treatment provisions in other BITs
would be directly relevant to the content of customary international law.250
The U.S. rejected Glamis’s reliance upon ELSI because “the arguments
concerning ‘arbitrary’ conduct in that case were based on lex specialis:
Article I of the Supplementary Agreement to the Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation between Italy and the United States, on which
the relevant claims in that case were based[.]”251 The United States
rejected the reliance upon BITs as such as evidence of customary

243

Id.
Id. ¶¶ 184, 187.
245
Id. ¶ 187.
246
Id. ¶¶ 210, 213.
247
Glamis Gold Ltd. v. U.S., Memorial of Claimant Glamis Gold Ltd., ¶ 521 (May 5, 2006).
248
Id. ¶¶ 526–531.
249
Id. ¶ 530. Glamis further relied upon other pleadings submitted by the United States in other
NAFTA proceedings. Glamis Gold Ltd. v. U.S., Reply of Claimant Glamis Gold Ltd., ¶ 216 (Dec. 15,
2006).
250
Id. ¶¶ 212–213.
251
Glamis Gold Ltd. v. U.S., Counter-Memorial of the U.S., ¶ 228 (Sept. 19, 2006).
244
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international law for essentially the same reasons.252
Merrill & Ring Forestry took a different approach to prove the content
of Article 1105 of NAFTA, relying principally on the submission that the
treatment prescribed by Article 1105 “is grounded in their [i.e., the NAFTA
treaty parties’] obligation to act in good faith.”253 Merrill & Ring Forestry
further submitted that Article 1105 could not be confined to customary
international law, but required reference to all sources of international
law.254 From there, Merrill & Ring Forestry submitted that the tribunal
should look to the general principle of law of good faith in order to define
the content of the fair and equitable treatment standard in Article 1105.255
Like in the Argentine cases, the NAFTA cases are “inconsistent” or
“convergent” only if they are divorced from their records. Glamis and
Merrill & Ring Forestry in critical respects differed in their submissions of
how arbitrators should integrate general international law in the
interpretation of Article 1105 of NAFTA. The outcomes reached by the
respective tribunals reflect this difference. Comparing NAFTA decisions
to each other in the abstract thus again risks comparing apples to oranges.
IV. THE COMMON LAW SOLUTION
The process of investor-state dispute resolution leaves little doubt that
investor-state arbitration forms part of a common law.256 In fact, it is not
seriously disputed that all participants in investor-state arbitration are
“employing styles of common law reasoning.”257 Despite this observation,
the major theories addressing investor-state arbitration shy away from
treating investor-state arbitration as forming part of a common law because

252

Glamis Gold Ltd. v. U.S., Rejoinder of the U.S., ¶ 142 (Mar. 15, 2007).
Merrill & Ring Forestry, L.P. v. Can., Reply Memorial of Claimant, ¶ 193 (Feb. 13, 2008).
254
Merrill & Ring Forestry, L.P. v. Can., Reply of Claimant, ¶ 305 (Dec. 15, 2008).
255
Id. ¶ 313.
256
It could be argued that international law is a mixed jurisdiction that combines aspects of the
civilian and common law traditions. In terms of the substance of international law in general, and the
application of international law to political risk disputes in particular, this is certainly accurate. It is the
proposition of this Article that this mixed jurisdiction systemically develops as a common law
jurisdiction would, rather than along the lines of a civilian jurisdiction. The key factors leading to this
conclusion are the lack of a common code of international law, the proliferation of international courts
and tribunals (and consequently international judicial decisions), and the International Law
Commission’s use of prior decisions from international courts and tribunals as a principal source of its
own codification (or restatement) efforts. See, e.g., James Crawford, The ILC’s Articles on
Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts: A Retrospect, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 874, 885
(2002). For a discussion of the mixed-jurisdiction development of “systemic respect for jurisprudence,”
see Mary Garvey Algero, The Sources of Law and the Value of Precedent: A Comparative and
Empirical Study of a Civil Law State in a Common Law Nation, 65 LA. L. REV. 775 (2005).
257
See, e.g., SCHILL, supra note 112, at 361; SALACUSE, LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra
note 108, at 155–56; Alvarez, A Bit on Custom, supra note 23, at 45; Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 19,
at 377; SORNARAJAH, supra note 37, at 333–62.
253
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of their focus on the outcome of arbitration over the arbitral process.258 It
was this focus that caused the major theories to fail.259
The remainder of this Article sets out how arbitral decisions in
investor-state arbitrations reveal the development of an international
common law that precisely overcomes the structural aporia which caused
prior theories to fail. It then addresses how the common law theory
overcomes the problems raised by existing theories. Finally, it provides a
structurally sound and descriptively accurate account of the persuasiveness
of jurisprudence in investor-state arbitrations.
A. International Common Law
The practice of investor-state arbitration goes beyond demonstrating
that its participants treat it as part of a common law. Due to the wealth of
decisional law and the variety of sources on which it is premised, it also
demonstrates the inherent theoretical value of a common law paradigm to
overcome the significant theoretical problems encountered by other
conceptions of investor-state arbitration, and international law adjudication
in general. As discussed below, the common law paradigm is particularly
apt for the further development of international law because of its
principally horizontal rather than vertical structure.260 This shift to a
common law paradigm helps to resolves a central aporia about the nature of
general international law posited by Martti Koskenniemi in From Apology
to Utopia by adding a new dimension.261
1. The Common Law Paradigm
The key systemic difference between common law and civil law
traditions is the manner in which legal axioms and rules are generated. The
civilian tradition operates principally along a vertical axis: it effectively
argues from first principles to the rules these first principles entail.262 The

258
The notable exception is CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, LAURENCE SHORE & MATTHEW WEINIGER,
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION, SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 70–75 (2007) (citing
Crawford, supra note 256, at 886). Crawford in context discusses whether civil law or common law
concepts of responsibility prevailed in the drafting of the articles. Crawford, supra note 256, at 885.
259
See supra Part II.
260
See infra Part IV.A.1.
261
See infra Part IV.A.2.
262
See, e.g., ANTONIO GAMBARO & RODOLFO SACCO, SISTEMI GIURIDICI COMPARATI 323 (2d ed.
2002) (noting that prevalent French legal theories of the twentieth century reconciled apparently
inconsistent legal rules through common first principles and used these first principles to generate
additional rules of law when needed to close lacunae); HANS BROX, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BGB 27
(29th ed. 2005) (“In an effort to prevent that the German Civil Code would become unmanageable, the
legislator derived concrete rules from ever more general principles by means of broadening
abstraction.”) (author translation); OLE LANDO, KORT INDFØRING I KOMPARATIV RET 204 (3rd ed.
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coherence of the system is “vertical” because it depends upon the link of a
rule (or decision) to the first principle.263 Consequently, interpretation in
the civil law moves along vertical lines, establishing the coherence of a
proposed interpretation with the axiomatic first principle and its coherence
with the conception of this first principle evident throughout the code in
other areas of law.264 It is a predominantly deductive paradigm.265
Critique within civilian tradition is similarly predominantly vertical.
It focuses on the tenability of the prevalent conception of the axiomatic
first principle in light of the results it achieves in actual practice.266 When
the results the conception achieves in actual practice achieves unjust
results, the conception of the first principle changes, leading to a significant
overhaul in the code of the jurisdiction in question, a systemic
reinterpretation of the existing code or fragmentation.267 Given the radical
nature of this step, civilian legal systems appear remarkably stable, with
few but radical realignments interspersed between periods of relative
2009) (“It must further be considered that German law in contradistinction to other legal systems is held
together by the principle of good faith or reasonableness, Treu und Glauben, which is used as corrective
when legal rules would lead to an injustice.”) (author translation).
263
See, e.g., H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 143 (2000) (“If there is no
Perfect Author, there are at least authors, whose ongoing arguments require ongoing response. The
notion that legislation and its interpretation are simply means of continuing the discussion, and not in
any way means of bringing it an end or limiting its breadth, is brilliantly represented in recent
continental writings. Inter, in the sense of the search for the truest meaning, would thus remain at the
heart of the civilian tradition, as it was in the time of Rome.”); KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN
INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 88 (Tony Weir trans., 2d ed. 1987) (“the Code civil is founded
on the creed of the Enlightenment and law of reason that social life can be put into a rational order if
only the rules of law are restructured according to a comprehensive plan”); MARCEL PLANIOL,
TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW 161 (Louisiana State Law Institute trans., 1959); BROX, supra note 262, at
27; LANDO, supra note 262, at 204. In this respect, civilian interpretation and legal development
follows along the lines of the ideal of perfect vertical coherence found in Dworkin. See, e.g., RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 333–54 (1986).
264
Reasoning by analogy in civil law jurisdictions is a mode of interpretation of the Code precisely
because the analogy works “through” the first principle. It highlights how the first principle is at work
in another area of law that could be applied by analogy to the question at bar. The analogy is similarly
“vertical” because it analytically develops the application of the first principle to the question at bar
rather than developing a truly horizontal coherence across areas that have facially inconsistent first
principles. See, e.g., GAMBARO & SACCO, supra note 262, at 323; BROX, supra note 262, at 41–44.
265
See, e.g., GLENN, supra note 263, at 133 (2000) (“deductive thought follows from this form
logic; given a point of departure, you can reach further conclusions which are derivable from it (or
entailed by it, some might say), in a consistent manner”).
266
See, e.g., PLANIOL, supra note 263, at 162 (“The logical method treats all these questions as if
they were theorems of geometry. It uses a corps of axioms containing in themselves the salutation to
practically all difficulties. The disadvantage of this method is that it causes law to function as it were a
blind piece of machinery, indifferent to the good or evil it might do. Laws, however, are made in order
to obtain for man the greatest possible amount of good. A juridical science which would lead to unjust
or dangerous solutions would be false. It would defeat its own purpose.”).
267
See, e.g., FRANÇOIS TERRÉ ET AL., DROIT CIVIL, LES OBLIGATIONS 17–18 (9th ed. 2005) (noting
the role of jurisprudence to make such adjustments “when necessary” and noting the emergence of new,
ever more specialized codes).
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jurisprudential tranquility.268
The common law, on the other hand, developed and develops through
the resolution of specific problems brought forward through actual
disputes.269 The common law tradition operates principally along a
horizontal axis: it argues from (and towards) the coherent solution of
related legal problems towards a common bond between them.270 The
coherence of the system is “horizontal” because it depends upon the bonds
between the solutions of related problems as such.271 Consequently, the
common law moves along horizontal lines by establishing rules rather than
“interpreting” legal rules.272
Rule establishment depends upon the
coherence of a proposed common law rule against the facts of each cases
relied upon by the parties.273 It is a predominantly inductive paradigm.274
268

See id. (noting the historical resistance to change in French civil law of obligations outside of
periods of significant change).
269
GAMBARO & SACCO, supra note 262, at 132–33, 256 (noting that the common law was by its
nature incomplete and grew through resolution of disputes); see also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS 11–19 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing the early development of the enforcement of promises at
common law). This form of development of the common law is critical to understanding the casebook
method, or contract law by anthology, currently underlying first-year U.S. law school curriculum. See,
e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Contract Scholarship in the Age of Anthology, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1406 (1987)
(discussing the evolution of common law of contracts scholarship through the case method since the
publication of Langdell’s contracts casebook in 1871). For a specific example of the historical vagaries
of this form of legal development, see Anthony Jon Waters, The Property in the Promise: A Study of the
Third Party Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1985) (explaining the record-based necessity for
the court in Lawrence v. Fox to develop the third party beneficiary rule and its infectious effect on the
development of U.S. common law thereafter).
270
For an extreme position, see Stephen R. Perry, Judicial Obligation, Precedent and the Common
Law, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 215, 257 (1987) (arguing that “‘the common law’ is best regarded as
the institutionalized process of adjudication itself, rather than as the body of relatively stable (but
nonetheless constantly changing) dispute-settling standards which emerge from that process”). A
similar position is espoused by Melvin Eisenberg in the context of finding morally necessary exceptions
to announced and otherwise coherent common law rules. See EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 66–68.
271
See, e.g., EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 54–55 (positing that the “announcement approach” is the
one ordinarily followed by courts, which uses the “rule of a precedent [which] consists of the rule that it
states, provided that the rule is relevant to issue raised by the dispute before the court”).
272
See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, Precedent, Induction, and Ethical Generalization, in PRECEDENT IN
LAW 183–216 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1988) (“common law reasoning, like that in science and ethics,
is non-hermeneutic in nature”); EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 52.
273
See, e.g., EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 54–55, 61; see also S.L. Hurley, Coherence, Hypothetical
Cases, and Precedent, 10 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 221, 223–24 (1990) (“The fourth stage is the heart
of the deliberative process. At this stage we engage in all-out theorizing, looking for hypotheses which
account for the resolutions of issues we found in stage three [gathering settled cases that have proposed
apparently conflicting solutions to relevant legal problems]. That is we are trying to formulate
hypotheses about the relationships between the conflicting reasons under various different
circumstances present in the stage three cases, which account for those resolutions.”).
274
See Moore, supra note 272, at 183–89 (arguing for an inductive, non-hermeneutic view of
common law precedent); DWORKIN, supra note 263, at 228–38 (analogizing the role of the judge to
writing part of a chain novel premised solely on the earlier parts of the novel); see generally Frederick
Schauer, Prescriptions in Three Dimensions, 82 IOWA L. REV. 911 (1997) [hereinafter Schauer,
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The inductive paradigm entails a different mode of rule establishment
and, consequently, a different modality of change.275 True to the inductive
nature of the common law, rule establishment occurs in the context of a
new case or problem.276 Due to its inductive nature, common law rule
establishment will problematize the facts of the new dispute in light of their
resemblance to facts of prior decisions.277 In relating the facts at bar to
their resemblance of facts in prior decisions, it is possible both to derive the
principle applicable to the resolution of the dispute at bar and to confirm
and adapt its validity in light of additional factual problems not previously
encountered in other cases.278 In this way, the common law develops on a
constant basis with the resolution of each new case.
This is not to say that the common law lacks axiomatic principles or
that the civil law is entirely static. Both characterizations, in this extreme
form, would caricature the legal systems in question. Thus, the common
law elevates the case which in its holding cleanly states an axiomatic norm
to paradigmatic status.279 Further, the art of interpretation of civil law, or
hermeneutics, cannot but gradually shift the meaning of civil code
provisions so as to make the provisions meaningful to the shared social and
linguistic experience of the jurists applying the code.280
But the fundamental difference between the principal directedness of
the legal system (vertical vs. horizontal) remains a necessary corollary of

Prescriptions] (discussing the inductive nature of the common law in Dworkin).
275
For the reasons discussed by Professor Eisenberg, the issue is one of “rule establishment” rather
than “interpretation” because “the role of the deciding court in determining what rule a precedent stands
for is not so much to determine what the precedent was intended to stand for as to determine what it has
or will come to stand for.” EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 52.
276
See, e.g., EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 54–55, 61; DWORKIN, supra note 263, at 228–38; Moore,
supra note 272, at 183; Perry, supra note 270, at 215.
277
See supra note 273.
278
See, e.g., EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 74 (discussing how this process operated in the context of
McPherson v. Buick Motor Co. and noting that the break with prior case law was appropriate because
its “rule came to be socially incongruent, it also came to lack consistency with the body of law” in other
areas). It is in this sense that the common law makes “available to us no formal decision procedure
which will make clear, in a reliable and certain way, which principles are applicable to which sorts of
cases, what weight they carry, and concrete results they support.” Perry, supra note 270, at 251. The
inductive nature of the process deprives legal argument of this kind of deductive certainty and replaces
it with a literally pragmatic point of view premised upon the totality of possible problem solutions
premised upon similarly cast factual problems.
279
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859); Arthur L. Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of
Third Persons, 27 YALE L.J. 1008, 1013 (1918) (“Although not the first case of the sort, the famous
case of Lawrence v. Fox is now regarded as the leading authority to the effect that a creditor-beneficiary
has an enforceable right.”); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Third-Party Beneficiaries, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1358,
1363 (1992) (“Although Lawrence v. Fox is often celebrated today as a landmark case that established
the power of a third-party beneficiary to bring suit, in reality the case was not very remarkable for its
time.”).
280
TERRÉ ET AL., supra note 262, at 17–18.
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the historical and analytical differences between both systems.281
Historically, the civil law developed “from the complete opposite” starting
point to the common law: “not from political power and its structures of
government, but from the absence of such structures and independently
from any existing political power.”282 The resulting system in the civil law
is thus by origin as philosophical as the common law is pragmatic.283 Their
structure of decision making still reflects this historical difference by
placing primacy on different aspects of a legal dispute (factual similarity
vs. legal fit).284
2. Investor-State Arbitration as Common Law
The experience of investor-state arbitration follows the paradigm of
the common law rather than the civil law not principally because of the
weight given to prior cases, as others suppose, but because of the manner in
which prior cases are employed.285 Counsels focus intensively on the
similarity of facts at bar to the facts of prior decisions.286 It is the similarity
of the factual situation to the earlier cases that conditions the interpretive
question about the applicable treaty, customary international law, general
principle of law, or unilateral act to be answered in the dispute.287 Counsels
in investor-state arbitration problematize the facts in the way of litigation in
the common law: adjudication turns first upon whether a proposed rule
(treaty interpretation proffered in a prior decision relied upon by counsel,
for example) “is relevant to the [factual] issues raised by the dispute.”288
Through the prism of the factual dispute between the parties, the
interpretation of legal texts such as treaties or contracts becomes a different
enterprise. These texts are not interpreted in a factual vacuum for abstract
legal content, for example, “What is the content of the fair and equitable
treatment standard in the Russia-Mongolia BIT?”289 Instead, the texts are
281

The same difference is noted, in a critical fashion, by Frederick Schauer. See Frederick Schauer,
Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883 (2006). The criticism he raised of the common law
method of law making (or, in Eisenberg’s terminology adopted for purposes of this Article, rule
establishment) is addressed further in Part IV.B infra.
282
GAMBARO & SACCO, supra note 262, at 245 (author translation).
283
See id.
284
See id.
285
See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER F. DUGAN, DON WALLACE, NOAH RUBINS & BORZU SABAHI,
INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 217 (2008); RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 35–37 (2012); Noemi Gal-Or, The Concept of Appeal in
International Dispute Settlement, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 43, 48 (2008) (noting as “paradoxical” that
international law developed on the basis of precedent while formally rejecting stare decisis).
286
See supra Part III.A.
287
See supra Part III.A.
288
EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 55.
289
See, e.g., Paushok et al. v. Mong., Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶ 255 (Apr. 28, 2011),
http://italaw.com/documents/PaushokAward.pdf (“the Tribunal will consider the interpretation of the Treaty in
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interpreted to determine whether specific conduct established on the basis
of record evidence and deemed legally relevant because of earlier cases
presented by the parties (failure to conclude a legal stability agreement in
the context of claim premised upon allegedly unfair and inequitable tax
increases) is actionable under the specific treaty language of, for instance,
the Russia-Mongolia BIT.290 Earlier decisions reached under different
legal instruments thus are not principally invoked to assist in the textual
interpretation of apparently unrelated documents; they are invoked to
define the problem to which the legally applicable document responds.291
The interpretive question then becomes whether specific language requires
deviation from the solution or logic applied to the problem at bar in case(s)
that addressed this same or similar problems.292
The common law approach can reconcile this currently prevalent
pragmatic approach to IIAs with the interpretive method of the VCLT. The
VCLT requires that the text of a treaty be interpreted according to its
“ordinary meaning.”293 On its face, this suggests a method more akin to the
hermeneutics of code interpretation than common law rule establishment.
But the meaning of “ordinary meaning” itself requires interpretation.294 It
is typically understood to require that interpretation give meaning to a term
similar to “a person reasonably informed in that subject.”295 This causes
the problem to regress one step because it is not going to be abstractly
apparent what the relevant “subject” is.
The common law approach allows for resolution of the problem of
what “ordinary meaning” to give treaty provisions.296 By making treaty
provisions speak to a problem, and contrasting it with existing legally
cognizable problem solutions, the common law approach specifically
defines the “reasonably informed person” as the one educated about the

the context of the specific claims made by Claimants”).
290
See discussion of Paushok, supra Part III.A.
291
See supra Part III.
292
As discussed in Part III, this is precisely the manner in which tribunals interpret IIAs. It is this
reliance upon prior decisions that is responsible, in significant part, for the debate between the three
approaches discussed in Part II.
293
VCLT, supra note 121, art. 31(1).
294
Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of Bol., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Objections to
Jurisdiction, ¶ 91 (Oct. 21, 2005) (“As Schwarzenberger observed, the word ‘meaning’ itself has at least
sixteen dictionary meanings.”).
295
ULF LINDERFALK, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES 67 (2007). Linderfalk gives, as one
example of interpretation in accordance with a technical meaning, the interpretation of a BIT provision
by an ICSID tribunal. Id. at 69–70; see also GARDINER, supra note 121, at 174 (“Thus the test is not
necessarily what the ordinary person would understand a term to mean but could take account of the
subject matter of the treaty so as to seek what a person reasonably informed in that subject, or having
access to evidence of what a reasonably informed person would make of the terms.”).
296
See Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of Bol., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Objections to
Jurisdiction, ¶ 91 (Oct. 21, 2005).
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legal problem to be answered in the dispute at bar.297 The common law
approach avoids circularity because the establishment of the legally
relevant problem and the legally relevant facts that an interpretation must
address precede interpretation and overlay (through case law) an
independent legal matrix over record assembled by the parties.298 Ordinary
meaning interpretation is thus perfectly consistent with a common law
approach.
The common law approach is further supported by the requirement of
systemic integration.299 In international law, systemic integration requires
that an interpretation take into account other rules of international law in
force between the parties.300 Systemic integration is a core principle of
rule establishment in the common law setting.301 A problem-based
approach will select the relevant “other rules of international law” from the
legally relevant facts.302 What makes facts legally relevant is determined
through the parties’ use of jurisprudence ascribing such legal relevance to
alleged conduct.303
The result of the common law paradigm is that the interpretations of
treaties and investment contracts subject to international law, general
principles of law, or domestic investment laws, are inherently opentextured.304 Past interpretations of bilateral investment treaties expand the
universe of legally relevant facts.305 Facts other than those made relevant
by past decisions in investor-state arbitrations can become legally relevant
through decisions in other international fora and thus expand the range of
problems to be resolved in future bilateral investment treaty arbitrations.306
297

See GARDINER, supra note 121, at 174; cf. Moore, supra note 272, at 183–216.
Cf. supra Part III (describing the current interpretive approach of investment treaty tribunals in
these terms).
299
VCLT, supra note 121, art. 31(3)(c).
300
Id. art. 31(3)(c); see also Campbell McLachlan, The Principle of Systemic Integration and
Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 279 (2005); Campbell McLachlan,
Investment Treaties and General International Law, 57 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 361 (2008).
301
See supra note 125.
302
See discussion of Argentine cases, supra Part III.B.1.
303
See discussion of Argentine cases, supra Part III.B.1.
304
“Open texture” is another way of expressing an indeterminacy. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT
OF LAW 128 (2d ed. 1994). The open texture here describes not an indeterminacy as concerns the
resolution of a specific dispute, but rather an indeterminacy of the broader system of law. The common
law traditionally is precisely conceived of as incomplete (and thus expanding by including additional
facts within the realm of the legally actionable). Hart would banish indeterminacy to the penumbra
only of rules of precedent, submitting that there is a core meaning as to which no indeterminacy is
applicable. Id. at 135. For a critique, see generally Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509
(1988). As discussed below, this solution to indeterminacy overstates the relative strength of rule
establishment.
305
See EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 74 (discussing the innovation in McPherson v. Buick Motor Co.
in similar terms).
306
On the expanding role of international law in general, see, for example, Pierre-Marie Dupuy,
The Danger of Fragmentation or Unification of the International Legal System and the International
298
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The common law that investor-state arbitration helps form is an
adaptive, if chaotic, organism.307 Because of the manner that the horizon of
rule establishment can shift with every case, the common law displays
significant horizontal coherence. In return, it gives up vertical coherence:
the shifting horizon of interpretation deprives the interpretive process, and
its result, of a strong substantive focal point.308 Nowhere is the relational,
rather than absolute, character of this law more on display than its central
protection of fair and equitable treatment and its identification with the
protection of legitimate investment-backed expectations. What is a “fair”
or “legitimate” expectation? The open texture of this question, its
dependence on appraisal of a reciprocal relationship between investor and
state, poses no problem for the horizontal conception of investor-state
arbitration. By contrast, in a vertically organized system, it is a question
that simply allows no legal resolution.309
3. Law in Multiple Dimensions
The common law approach, unlike the prevalent theories about
international investment arbitration, can overcome Koskenniemi’s
aporia.310 As discussed above, Koskenniemi’s aporia is premised upon the
identification in international legal argument of two logically inconsistent
premises, namely that (1) an international legal obligation is binding solely
because of state consent to the rule (apology), and (2) states are legally
bound by an international legal rule whether or not they object to it
(utopia).311 Using this dichotomy, Koskenniemi concludes the following as

Court of Justice, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. 791, 794 (1999).
307
See, e.g., Elizabeth D. De Armond, A Dearth of Remedies, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 37–38
(2008) (summarizing scholarship on the nature of the common law of torts as “common law, by
changing shape with each new decision, can ‘embody the fundamental values of a society’ as those
values shift over time and respond to developments in technology, industry, and moral reasoning. It has
a record of adapting over centuries to societies’ needs as they evolve: ‘It is the peculiar merit of the
common law that its principles are so flexible and expansive as to comprehend any new wrong that may
be developed by the inexhaustible resources of human depravity.’ An early torts scholar described the
common law as ‘an organism which is almost purely of natural growth.’”).
308
Rather than as a single principle, substantial unity is currently provided through open-ended, and
internally contradictory, lists or canons of what international law seeks to achieve. This method
precisely evidences the lack of a single axiomatic principle (such as, for example, “sovereign equality”)
that could serve as a vertical organizing principle for the entirety of international law. Dupuy, supra
note 306, at 795 (“For instance, the rules prohibiting the use of force, outlawing genocide, and
establishing non-intervention, the rights of people, and the basic rights of the human person are parts of
this substantial set of unifying rules.”). Non-intervention and prohibition of the use of force facially
contradict the prohibition of genocide. If genocide occurs, there must be a right of intervention for the
international legal obligation to have more than hortatory force.
309
KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 1, at 330–31.
310
See id.
311
See discussion supra Part II.D.
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a matter of theory:
In situations of uncertainty (hard cases) we are thrown back into
having to argue both what the law’s content is and why we
consider it binding on the State. To avoid utopianism, we must
establish the law’s content so that it corresponds to concrete State
practice, will and interest. But to avoid apologism, we must
argue that that it binds the State regardless of its behaviour, will
or interest.312
Koskenniemi’s critique is cogent only if law is conceived of as a
deductive enterprise. Deductive reasoning proceeds by syllogism, i.e., an
argument in which the conclusion follows necessarily from a major and
minor premise.313 If the major and the minor premise in an argument
contradict each other, the syllogism cannot be closed. Koskenniemi’s point
is to identify a logical inconsistency in the premises of international legal
argument.314 The aporia therefore is problematic only to the extent that it is
assumed that law is inherently deductive.
Koskenniemi’s critique is defeated when international law is viewed
not from the vantage point of a deductive legal order but instead as an
inductive form of reason. From at least Aristotle onwards, philosophers
and lawyers have commented on the inductive nature of legal argument in
general.315 The common law, being principally derived from legal
argument, places a systemic premium on the inductive nature of law
itself.316 Both classic common law theorists and legal realists have
defended the virtue of the inductive process over deductive legal
reasoning.317
Viewed from the perspective of inductive reasoning, there is nothing
strange about the aporia highlighted by Koskenniemi: inductive argument
relies upon, and formulates rules from, the observation of relevant facts.318
To borrow from the philosophy of science, it is similarly a truism that any
observation of facts to form a theory depends on the existence of a higherorder paradigm to which the facts are relevant.319 Scientific discourse, and
312

KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 1, at 66.
See, e.g., CHARLES R. CALLEROS, LEGAL METHOD AND WRITING 68–69 (5th ed. 2006).
314
See discussion supra Part II.D.
315
See, e.g., Miles F. Burnyeat, Enthymene: Aristotle on the Rationality of Rhetoric, in ESSAYS ON
ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC (Amelie Rorty ed., 1996).
316
See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
317
See, e.g., Wilson Huhn, The Use and Limits of Syllogistic Reasoning in Briefing Cases, 42
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 813, 825–29 (2002) (providing an overview of the history of theoretical
rejection of deductive logic as ordering principle in U.S. common law in the late nineteenth and
twentieth centuries).
318
See discussion supra Part IV.A.1.
319
See THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 81, 96–105 (2012).
313
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other inductive discourse, similarly functions by an oscillating movement
between facts and norms, each of which depending on the other for its
ultimate support.320
The fundamental distinction between the world in which
Koskenniemi’s aporia turns into a paradox and one in which it is a simple
description of the modality of rule formation is a question of how norms
are recognized. In a deductive system, it is assumed that the ultimate
paradigm is closed. Recognition depends on the placement of a rule within
a full interpretation or rationalization of the larger paradigm.321 Both the
philosophy of language and the philosophy of science challenge this view
of paradigm coherence on the basis of the insights garnered by Ludwig
Wittgenstein.322 Kuhn, in his seminal work on scientific revolutions,
summarizes this debate:
That question is very old and has generally been answered by
saying that we must know, consciously or intuitively, what a
chair, or leaf, or game is. We must, that is, grasp some set of
attributes that all games and that only games have in common.
Wittgenstein, however, concluded that, given the way we use
language and the sort of world to which we apply it, there need
be no such characteristics. Though a discussion of some of the
attributes shared by a number of games and chairs or leaves often
held us learn how to employ the corresponding term, there is no
set of characteristics that is simultaneously applicable to all
members of the class and to them alone. Instead, confronted with
a previously unobserved activity, we apply the term “game”
because what we are seeing bears a close “family resemblance”
to a number of the activities that we have previously learned to
call by that name. For Wittgenstein, in short, games, and chairs,
and leaves are natural families, each constituted by a network of
overlapping and crisscross of resemblances. The existence of
such a network sufficiently accounts for our success in
identifying the corresponding object or activity.323
International law, conceived of as an inductive process, precisely
follows this insight. Family resemblance is both ascending, i.e., premised
upon prior observation, and descending, i.e., applying a norm to make a
new observation fit within the language of the discipline.324 Obviously,
320

Id.
Id. at 108.
322
See generally LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (P.M.S. Hacker &
Joachim Schulte eds., 4th ed. 2009).
323
See KUHN, supra note 319, at 108–09.
324
See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 322.
321
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this process too must oscillate between observation and norm-application
for either the observation or the norm to make sense.325 Rather than being
mutually exclusive of each other, the ascending and descending patterns of
argument are mutually supportive, and as such support the open texture, or
in Koskenniemi’s terms, “openness” of legal language.326
This inductive openness or open texture of international law departs
from the single dimension imagined by Koskenniemi by introducing a new,
integrative dimension. This integrative dimension transforms phenomena
that, by themselves, are of no significance to facts to be accounted for in
legal argument. This integrative move stabilizes oscillation from falling
into nonsense and makes it possible to speak of different legal arguments
and choose between them by finding, on the basis of conduct, which family
resemblance invoked by the parties in fact fits most closely the problem at
hand.
Koskenniemi unsuccessfully seeks to defend his aporia against what
he calls the “law as fact” approach.327 His main objection to such an
approach is that “it ignores the determining power of the law as a
conceptual scheme which controls our perception of the facts of
international society.”328 This rejoinder misses the point because it
assumes that the conceptual scheme provided is deductive rather than
inductive, that it provides a paradigm that permits a seamless placement of
a rule by means of a full interpretation or rationalization of the larger
paradigm itself.329 The common law approach rejects such a view and
relies precisely on the interaction of fact and the conceptual framework to
which it is relevant to form an inductively coherent, pragmatic, and organic
system.330
4. Resolving the Problems of the Prevalent Approaches
The common law approach can resolve the problems of the prevalent
approaches discussed above. The inductive nature of the common law
approach does not need to overstate the internal uniformity or the
convergence of the IIA regime in order to make prior decisions of arbitral
tribunals under different treaty instruments relevant to interpretation. It
also does not need to elevate arbitral decisions to formal sources of
international law. Rather, it allows an understanding of the modality and
value of both convergence and divergence.

325
326
327
328
329
330
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See id. at 522–32.
See id. at 524.
See KUHN, supra note 319, at 108.
See supra notes 275–280.
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a. Problems of the Custom and Regime Approaches
Both the customary international law and regime approaches
recognized that the decisions of IIA arbitral tribunals are highly influential
for the resolution of future IIA disputes.331 This insight posited the
formation of a new body of law out of the growth of IIAs themselves and
the decisions that interpreted them.332 The problems faced by both
approaches, although to different degrees, were twofold. First, they
overstated the coherence of IIAs and IIA awards in order to create a
sufficiently cohesive system that would justify future reliance on past IIA
awards.333 Second, they overstated the independence of IIA decisions from
other areas of law and thereby created a closed system that did not
resemble the open texture of the body of IIA decisions.334
The common law approach fully credits the insight that IIA decisions
are highly influential in future IIA disputes.335 It acknowledges the central
importance of IIA decisions to the international legal enterprise.336 It
places these decisions at the forefront of the interpretive exercise engaged
in by international tribunals both by selecting the specific factual question
an interpretation has to answer and by identifying the relevant rules of law
to take into account in the process of interpretation.337
But the common law approach does so without overstating the
coherence of IIAs or IIA awards critical to the customary international
theory and, to a somewhat lesser degree, the regime theory. The common
law approach concerns itself with the horizontal coherence between
decisions (i.e., the understanding of the scope of legally relevant facts to
take into account in an interpretation).338 It does not principally draw on
the vertical cohesion between decisions or the IIAs on which they rely (i.e.,
the common legal rule that all of the decisions interpret, whether in a
moderately different form).339 This change in focus permits the common
law approach to abandon the requirement of a single legal rule or principle
that all the decisions interpret in common. It can treat each IIA as a
distinctly different international legal bargain (and consequently each IIA
decision as interpreting a different bargain) without giving up the key
relevance of these decisions for setting the interpretive horizon for future
IIA disputes.

331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339

See discussion supra Parts II.A–B.
See discussion supra Parts II.A–B.
See discussion supra Parts II.A–B.
See discussion supra Parts II.A–C.
See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.
See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.
See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.
See discussion supra Part IV.A.1.
See discussion supra Part IV.A.1.
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But the common law approach also does not submit that every IIA is a
fundamentally different bargain in all respects. Rather, it is a method that
permits discovery of relevant differences in drafting between IIAs in light
of specific factual problems at bar during IIA disputes.340 The common
law approach is consistent with the hypothesis of a core overlap between
many IIAs regarding their historical development to be tested in every
case.341 The point is that the common law approach can make relevant to
the analysis of an IIA at bar decisions of a tribunal interpreting a
completely different treaty instrument, such as another IIA or even the
GATT or European Convention on Human Rights, by making relevant the
facts of that dispute as a point of comparison.342 This was a problem that
either the regime theory or the customary international law theory could
overcome.
The common law approach also does not need to divorce the body of
IIA awards from general international law to the degree that regime theory
must do. In order to be a self-contained regime, an area of law must exhibit
significant separation from general international law with respect to both
primary and secondary rules of liability.343 IIA decisions rely upon the
secondary rules of general international law.344 IIA decisions interpret the
primary rules contained in IIAs by reference to decisions such as general
international law decisions, WTO decisions, and human rights decisions.345
This significantly hampered the plausibility of the regime theory as a
descriptive matter.346
The common law approach encourages parties to draw on a broad set
of international legal decisions to set the scope of legally relevant facts that
must be taken into account in interpreting an IIA. It rejects any
interposition of a strong paradigm of “international investment law”
because it takes seriously the open texture of investor-state decisions to
date.347 In doing so, it can explain how IIA decisions are relevant—and in
many instances more relevant—than general international law decisions.
The factual problems will have a higher likelihood of overlap given the
similarity of problems (investor rights) and actors (e.g., investors, host
states, and host state agencies).348 That does not mean, however, that only
those actors are relevant.
To the contrary, analogy to problems

340

See discussion supra Parts IV.A.1–2.
See discussion supra Parts IV.A.1–2.
342
See discussion supra Parts IV.A.1–2.
343
See discussion supra Part II.C.1.
344
See discussion supra Part III.A.
345
See discussion supra Part III.A.
346
See discussion supra Part II.C.
347
See discussion supra Part IV.A.1.
348
See Frédéric G. Sourgens, Keep the Faith: Investment Protection Following the Denunciation of
International Investment Agreements, 11 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 335 (2013).
341
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encountered in other areas is highly persuasive and at times dispositive in
IIA disputes to the point of informing a common understanding of the key
problem of fair and equitable treatment across IIAs (if not always
informing its common solution).349
In sum, the common law approach can better account for the original
impetus of both the regime theory and the customary international law
theory: IIA awards are highly persuasive in future disputes even though
these disputes have no common party. It provides a better description than
either theory because it allows for a greater divergence between IIAs and
IIA awards, and a greater amount of reliance on non-IIA sources. The open
texture it achieves is also normatively preferable precisely because it does
not risk breaking apart international law into fully autonomous fiefdoms of
an ever more rarified group of experts.
b. The Lex Specialis Problem
Authors calling into question the systemic legitimacy of investor-state
arbitration identified two central problems of prevalent approaches to
international investment law.
First, they identified normative
overstatements on the part of proponents of the customary international law
and regime theorists of investor-state arbitration.350 Second, they submitted
that current international legal approaches dealt poorly with the emergence
of international investors as independent right holders (or, at the very least,
claimants) on the international legal stage.351 Although it is likely that
critics would reiterate their complaints with respect to the common law
approach, this approach in fact takes into account both key insights.
Thus, critics of the legitimacy of international investment law will
submit that treating arbitral awards as part of a common law exacerbates
(rather than resolves) the problem they have identified. They will submit
that a common law system precisely relies upon the status of case law as a
formal source of law (i.e., a source “imparting to a given rule the force of
law”).352 Judicial and arbitral decision precisely lack such force under
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice which lists the
commonly agreed upon sources of international law.353 Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice at most admits to the use of
judicial and arbitral decisions as material sources of law, and then only
insofar as they point out the normative content of formal sources of

349

See discussion supra Part III.A.
See discussion supra Part II.B.
351
See discussion supra Part II.B.
352
See, e.g., GODEFRIDUS J. H. HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 58
(1983) (summarizing the debate on the difference between formal and material sources of international
law).
353
ICJ Statute, supra note 25, art. 38.
350
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international law.
This criticism is misplaced. As discussed more fully below, in a
common law system, decisions have binding force only within a hierarchy
of courts.354 There is no hierarchy of international courts or tribunals in
international law.355 The decisions of international courts and tribunals are
not binding authority; they are persuasive.356 The common law approach
thus does not submit, as this criticism supposes, that the decisions of
international courts and tribunals are formal sources of international law.
The original criticism is in fact resolved by the common law approach.
Functionally, the common law approach uses prior decisions of
international courts and tribunals in the manner critics would submit they
should be used: the decisions aid in the interpretation of the relevant formal
source of international law.357 Cases frame the issue in the case at bar by
identifying the legally relevant facts for which the interpretation of the
legal instrument has to account.358 They identify the relevant audience to
determine the ordinary meaning of a treaty provision.359 They point out the
relevant areas of international law in resolving the dispute.360 They provide
concrete points of comparison of possible interpretations of similar
language in similar factual contexts.361 In all these regards, the decisions
do not independently have force of law but have value only to the extent
they illuminate the content of the applicable rules of international law.362 It
was this independent force of law to which critics appeared to be most
vehemently—and correctly—opposed.
The related criticism that the use of international decisions is
illegitimate because states have not consented to its use can similarly be
resolved.363 Even accepting the premise that international law is binding on
a state only to the extent it has specifically consented, state parties to
international arbitral proceedings use cases in the same manner as
claimants.364 They use cases to identify relevant conduct that an
interpretation of the key legal instruments has to take into account.365 They
submit cases reaching favorable interpretations in cases they submit to be
factually similar.366 They distinguish cases on the facts submitted by
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
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opposing counsel. It is this technique, not the substance of each particular
decision, which makes up the common law approach. State conduct in
every arbitral proceeding in which the state has legal counsel amply
supports this technique.
The common law approach similarly takes seriously that investor-state
arbitration is the bellwether of introducing public international law into a
world beyond state-to-state behavior. Investor-state arbitration gives nonstate actors immediate rights of action for significant damages against
states premised upon international law.367 As critics point out, this
situation leads to different problems for international law to answer than in
the context of state-to-state disputes because in the state-to-state context,
international obligations are typically reciprocal, whereas in the investorstate context, international obligations are principally unilateral, binding
the host state rather than the foreign investor.
The common law approach precisely answers this concern by placing
the similarity of facts in the current disputes to facts in prior adjudications
at the heart of its method. It seeks to develop how the factual predicates of
a specific dispute affect immediate investor rights (as opposed to the rights
of the home state acting in diplomatic protection). In doing so, it uses facts
relied upon by host states in defense of disputed measures to determine the
appropriate interpretation of the legal instruments invoked by the investor.
It further allows host states to develop factual predicates of investor
liability in regularly litigated counterclaims by host states against foreign
investors. The open texture of the common law approach thus permits the
critics to bring their concerns forward within the context of the law as it
currently exists rather than having to counsel abandoning the enterprise
entirely.
B. Prior Decisions as Persuasive Precedent
So far, the focus has been upon the systemic functions of the common
law approach: how does the common law approach change our
appreciation of the role of international law in the resolution of investorstate disputes as a whole? What remains to be developed is the particular
manner in which prior decisions are used in each case. This section
develops such a theory of persuasive precedent.
A misconception about the common law approach, as applied to
international law, is that the common law approach must import rules of
stare decisis.368 Because authors reject that these rules can be imported in
every case, they opt for a civil law-inspired system of “jurisprudence
367

See Sourgens, supra note 348.
See, e.g., DUGAN, supra note 285, at 217; DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 285, at 35–37; GalOr, supra note 285, at 48 (noting as paradoxical that international law developed on the basis of
precedent while formally rejecting stare decisis).
368
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constante”⎯binding precedent once a critical mass of decisions have
resolved an issue of law in the same manner.369 Viewed through the lens of
the common law approach, this misconception can be corrected,370 thereby
materially altering the legitimacy debate⎯whether inconsistent outcomes
are a danger to international law.371
1. The Stare Decisis Fallacy
Rejecting the common law approach because it would import the rules
of stare decisis is a structural and a substantive fallacy. In resolving these
fallacies, it is possible to arrive at an understanding of persuasive precedent
that better reflects the current state of international law.
The structural fallacy, mentioned above, translates the stare decisis
rules, which operate only within a hierarchy of courts, to a dispute
resolution system that is non-hierarchical. In the most scrutinized sense,
stare decisis requires the highest court in a jurisdiction to follow its own
precedent.372 And in terms of binding precedent, stare decisis requires
lower courts to follow apposite case law from higher courts within the
same jurisdiction.373 Lower courts may also have to follow apposite case
law issued by other panels within the same court.374
The structure of international law dispute resolution does not meet any
of the prerequisites of stare decisis or binding precedent. There is no
hierarchy of international courts and tribunals375⎯they operate alongside,

369

Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 19, at 377; cf. Bjorklund, Emerging Civilization, supra note 170,
at 1295 (“The better analogy, and the approach towards which investment arbitration is headed, is to the
jurisprudence constante of the French civil law tradition. Such an analogy is appealing for several
reasons. First, it recognizes that the starting point for analysis should be the language of the
treaty⎯just as the starting point should be the code in a municipal civil law system. Secondarily, but
not insignificantly, tribunals would then turn to the decisions of other tribunals interpreting the same or
similar treaty language. These decisions could be viewed as persuasive to the extent they were well
reasoned. Moreover, doctrine would develop through the accretion of awards decided in a consistent
manner⎯the ‘method of small paces.’”).
370
See discussion infra Part IV.B.1.
371
See discussion infra IV.B.2.
372
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–69 (1992); Jeremy Waldron, Stare
Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2012).
373
See, e.g., Algero, supra note 256, at 783–86 (summarizing the historical development of stare
decisis in English and American common law). For a discussion of stare decisis at the federal circuit
court and district court level, see generally Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the
United States, 12 NEV. L.J. 787 (2012) (examining the law of the circuit practice of U.S. federal circuit
courts through which future three-judge panels are bound by published decisions of three-judge panels
from the circuit in question and noting the problems resulting from a lack of a similar doctrine at the
district court level).
374
See Mead, supra note 373.
375
See, e.g., Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 123, at 1002; Rao, supra note 35, at 936;
Stephan, supra note 6, at 1591–92.

240

SOURGENS_FINAL_WEB.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

6/20/14 7:37 PM

Law’s Laboratory
34:181 (2014)

and in competition with, each other.376 Furthermore, in the context of
adjudicating investor-state disputes, tribunals are fully independent of each
other and do not function as different panels of the same court.377 Even
under a more regimented system of investor-state arbitration, decisions
interpreting the same IIA could create different kinds of stare decisis.378
Even if such a system existed, its severe limitations are apparent when
considering the diversity of respondent states in investor-state
arbitrations.379
Similarly, it is a substantive fallacy to suggest that a critical mass of
decisions reaching the same result requires reproducing their results
because “stare decisis . . . applie[s] not to a single decision, but to a line of
cases, or a jurisprudence constante.”380 This line of reasoning overreaches
and under-explains current practices in investor-state arbitrations.381
Specifically, jurisprudence constante exaggerates the weight of precedence
because tribunals frequently rule against settled case law.382 For instance,
the Glamis decision concerning the scope of NAFTA’s fair and equitable
treatment standard significantly departs from what proponents of
jurisprudence constante consider settled case law.383 Tribunals also
frequently rely upon a single case decision without considering whether
that decision is broadly accepted.384
The common law treatment of precedent better reflects current
practices in investor-state arbitration because even a single decision by an
out-of-state court can be highly persuasive, and perhaps even binding, if it

376

See, e.g., Cogan, supra note 6, at 438–46; Stephan, supra note 6, at 1606–17.
See, e.g., Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, art. 53, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 160.
378
See, e.g., Treaty Between the United States of America and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Uru., Nov. 5, 2005,
T.I.A.S. No. 06-1101, Annex E (limiting appellate mechanism to disputes arising under the bilateral
treaty).
379
See ICSID, supra note 87.
380
Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 19, at 376.
381
Id. at 377.
382
See id. at 372–73.
383
For a discussion of Glamis, see supra Part III.B.2.
384
See, e.g., Sempra Energy Int’l v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, ¶¶ 123–128 (May 11, 2005)
(relying upon two recent arbitral decisions that had not been consistently endorsed); see also Perenco
Ecuador Ltd. v. Republic of Ecuador & Empresa Estatal Petróleos del Ecuador (Petroecuador), ICSID
Case No. ARB/08/6, Provisional Measures, ¶¶ 50, 55 (May 8, 2009) (relying on a decision issued only
months earlier). Given the pattern of investor-state arbitrations, a rigid application of the jurisprudence
constante would result in procedural unfairness. For instance, several decisions on windfall taxation
have been issued in a three-year span. In this timeframe, claims regarding similar measures were
already pending. Using a jurisprudence constante approach, these claims would have been mooted by
third-party proceedings that the remaining claimants did not participate in and on the basis of
fundamentally different records. Thus, a jurisprudence constante approach runs the risk of seriously
conflicting with due process rights.
377
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is convincing.385 A decision’s persuasiveness is determined by the
precision with which it analyzes a problem that is relevant to a subsequent
case.386 A decision is particularly persuasive when it addresses the same
problem or rejects a principal argument in the current case.387 A decision
can also be highly persuasive if it makes a question in the current case less
vague or ambiguous.388 And adopting such a decision would further the
development of a newly expanded paradigm.389
Alternatively, a decision’s persuasiveness may depend on its weight,
otherwise known as “[its] ability . . . to prevail against a prescription
indicating the opposite result.”390 The measure of the “ability of a
prescription to prevail” is the frequency with which it bests other rival
prescriptions.391 Weight replicates the concern of the jurisprudence
constante that a string of decisions in which a prescription prevailed ought
to be given deference.392 In the common law approach, weight is one factor
of persuasion rather than the exclusive one.393 Further, as evidenced by the
continued existence of minority rules in U.S. common law, weight alone
does not guarantee convergence without the presence of additional
elements.394
Persuasiveness more generally also can be aphoristic or canonical.395
Although canonical statements are typically considered to be binding in the
formal sense, the anthologizing of decisional law that is not formally

385

See Richard Bronaugh, Persuasive Precedent, in PRECEDENT IN LAW 223 (Laurence Goldstein
ed., 1987) (“Any serious consideration of a persuasive precedent in an opinion (i.e. not ignoring it or
merely mentioning it as of minor relevance) can have only one of two purposes, the writer either has
been convinced by it or is distinguishing it (which renders its convincingness of no account).”).
386
See Schauer, Prescriptions, supra note 274, at 913 (“For present purposes, therefore, the
important dimension is not a dimension in which the opposite of particularity is generality, but rather
one in which particularity is best seen as specificity or precision, and its opposite as vagueness.”).
387
See Chad W. Flanders, Toward a Theory of Persuasive Authority, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 55, 67
(2009).
388
See Schauer, Prescriptions, supra note 274, at 913.
389
See KUHN, supra note 319, at 96–105; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO, A STUDY IN
REPUTATION (1990) (stating that Benjamin Cardozo was a master of persuasion through his precise
casting of problems).
390
Schauer, Prescriptions, supra note 274, at 919.
391
See id.
392
Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 19.
393
See Schauer, Prescriptions, supra note 274, at 919.
394
See id.
395
Id. at 916 (“A canonical prescription . . . is one that appears in specific written form as a
prescription and for which there is a common source and a common point of reference. . . . And so too
is a prescription set forth at one time and in one place by a court, at least where it is expected that this is
the form of the prescription that is the starting point for lower courts and others who are bound by it.
The three-part test for obscenity in Miller v. California is canonical in much the same way that statutory
provisions are canonical and so is the actual malice rule of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and the form
of the warning in Miranda v. Arizona.”).
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binding, for example in textbooks, can also be described as canonical.396
The decisions included in the canon share an aphoristic quality, as the
expression of the third-party beneficiary rule in Lawrence v. Fox
illustrates.397 In other instances, the poignancy of their specific facts turns
the affirmation of a rule of law into a symbolic or emblematic totem for the
rule, as could be argued is the case in Hamer v. Sidway.398 Adopting these
decisions strengthens the expression of the paradigm.
This common law process of persuasion better describes how arbitral
tribunals treat prior decisions. As an international law scholar noted about
the relationship between the various decisions of international courts and
tribunals:
By contrast to the binding nature of the judgments of superior
courts, it belongs to the logic of networks that autonomous
regimes enter into relations of mutual observation. Legal
certainty within this polycentric legal system cannot be furnished
by a hierarchically superior decisional instance placed at the
center of the law. Rather, what can be realistically expected is
uncertainty absorption in a process of iterative connection of
legal decision to legal decision that recalls the strict precedent
tradition, but that also departs from it in various significant
ways.399
The common law approach takes this nature of international law into
account without giving up a manner in which the persuasive force of crossfertilization can be explained and harnessed. By treating the persuasive
precedent along the axes of precision, weight, and canonicity, it is possible
to account for why decisions frequently are uniform on similar questions of
law without becoming static or guaranteeing complete convergence. By
giving these factors persuasive force rather than using them to explain
binding force, they further fit within the broader inductive framework of
the common law described in the previous section. Weight and canonicity
are the conservative forces anchoring legal analysis in past
conceptualizations of the law. Precision on the other hand permits a
reshaping of both weight and canonicity by forcing decision to include
facts, which make relevant a different resolution to the problem than the
weight of prior decisions would facially suggest.

396
397
398
399

Id.; see also Farnsworth, supra note 269.
Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859); see also supra note 279.
Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891); see also Farnsworth, supra note 269, at 1442–43.
Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 123, at 1039–40.

243

SOURGENS_FINAL_WEB.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

6/20/14 7:37 PM

34:181 (2014)

2. Legitimacy Restored: The Virtue of Divergence
The common law approach makes strides in resolving the legitimacy
challenge of international law resolution of disputes between investors and
their host states.400 Rather than considering divergence an evil to be
avoided, it is one of the happy incidents of the lack of hierarchy between
tribunals underlying the common law approach that a single courageous
tribunal may, if the parties choose, serve as a laboratory and try novel legal
approaches to social and economic problems in international law without
risking the rest of the body of international law.401 Further, the decisions
reached by any tribunal follow the input of the parties in framing and
presenting their case to the tribunal rather than the proclivities of the
arbitrators.402 The common law approach thus develops a view of
international law that is open textured, grounded in party consent, and
ultimately responsive to the justice of the proposed problem’s solutions in
jurisprudence.403
By virtue of the multiplicity of international courts and tribunals, the
lack of a hierarchy of tribunals will, perforce, lead to divergence.404
Similar divergence is amply on display in the disagreement on common
law rules between U.S. states.405 It is evident in circuit splits on questions
of federal law not dispositively resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court.406
This divergence does not, by and large, undermine the legitimacy of state
common law or U.S. federal law. It similarly should not lead to any
conclusions about the legitimacy of international law or adjudication.
Apart from this straightforward observation, the common law supports

400

See discussion supra Part II.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of
the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve
as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
402
See discussion supra Part III.
403
Cf. discussion supra Part IV.A.
404
See discussion supra Part IV.B.
405
The development of promissory estoppel in the United States may be one such example. See,
e.g., Kevin M. Teeven, A History of Promissory Estoppel: Growth in the Face of Doctrinal Resistance,
72 TENN. L. REV. 1111 (2005). A controversy whether promissory estoppel is a reliance or a
promissory theory of liability continues to rage on. Compare Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The
Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE L.J. 111 (1991) (arguing that promissory estoppel rests upon
promissory liability, not reliance liability), with Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the “New Consensus”
on Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical and Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 580 (1998) (arguing
that promissory estoppel rests upon reliance); see also Marco J. Jimenez, The Many Faces of
Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical Analysis Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 57 UCLA
L. REV. 669 (2010) (judges typically combine both approaches in a hybrid understanding of promissory
estoppel).
406
See generally Emily Grant, Scott A. Hendrickson & Michael S. Lynch, The Ideological Divide:
Conflict and the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decision, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 559 (2012) (discussing the
limited circumstances when circuit splits are resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court).
401
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not only that divergence is to be expected, but also that it is to be desired.
A key to the persuasiveness of international legal decisions is their
increased precision with which to understand the problem presented for
resolution.407 The recent turn to adjudication in international law has
revealed the relative, and frequently purposeful, vagueness of international
law.408 To formulate precise norms of international law, different
problematizations of common fact patterns reflect, not the illegitimacy of
the dispute resolution process, but the original vagueness of the law being
applied.
It is through the mediation of different problematizations of common
fact patterns that international law itself can contrast problem solutions. It
is this divergence that permits the weight of a problem solution to be tested
at all. It is this divergence that permits an appraisal of the relative precision
with which actual problems can be answered by international legal
analysis.409 It is this laboratory that permits, eventually, the authoring of
canonical problem solutions.410 Disagreement between tribunals, therefore,
is a sign of healthy development and serves the ultimate development of
the law towards better, more precise norms in the future.411
The experimental nature of adjudication is evidence of legitimacy of
international dispute resolution in yet another manner. Authors have
submitted that international adjudication is running away from state
consent and creating an illegitimate law because the judicial and arbitral
outcomes do not reflect the will of its subjects. Divergence in international
dispute resolution tends to disprove this submission.412 Divergence reveals
the responsiveness of international dispute resolution to the process of
pleading and presenting the case by the parties.413 This responsiveness
means that the law develops only because of the will, and with the
“consent,” of disputing parties to the outcome of international dispute
resolution, if only because the losing party was unable to persuade the
tribunal of a “better” outcome, i.e., a more precise, weightier, or more
paradigmatic solution to the litigation.
Not enough, a party considering the result reached in prior decisions
unjust is not precluded by the common law approach to relitigate its case in
future disputes. The status quo ante is only law so long as it is persuasive.
A truly unjust result will in short order not only come to be socially
incongruent, but also come to lack consistency with the growing body of

407

See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.
See, e.g., Charles H. Brower, II, Structure, Legitimacy, and NAFTA’s Investment Chapter, 36
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 37, 66 n.163 (2003).
409
See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.
410
See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.
411
See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.
412
See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.
413
See discussion supra Part III.B.
408
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the law around it.414 And change.415
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
This Article began by taking stock of the academic responses to the
proliferation of international dispute resolution of investor-state disputes
that failed. It uncovered that common to all these theories was the
superimposition of a substantive organizing principle over the wealth of
jurisprudence (strong property protection, strong regulatory sovereignty, a
grand bargain of protection for development promotion).
These
substantive principles failed to reflect both treaty and arbitral practice.
The Article proceeded to explain that the problem of academic
theorizing about investor-state arbitration was their search for a substantive
organizing principle in the first place. It explained that no such substantive
principle is likely to emerge. The proliferation of international law and
adjudication introduced a heterogeneity that could no longer be overcome
by further abstraction or deduction.
The Article proposed that the appropriate solution for international
law scholarship was not to search for the elusive first principle—an
exercise as fruitful as Waiting for Godot—but rather to treat international
law as process. Viewed in this manner, it became apparent that
international adjudication behaves like the common law, inductively and
pragmatically. Precedent became the conceptual language through which
to understand new disputes and the limits of international legal problem
solution. But the inductive nature of the legal process explained why this
language of international law resembled more the new lingua franca of
international law, English, rather than its Latin predecessor. It continues to
expand by creating new family resemblances between new problems and
old solutions. These new resemblances enrich its conceptual grammar and
vocabulary. Just like English, and unlike Latin, this conceptual language
continues to adapt to new technology, political sea change, and shifts in
culture.
The value of this conception of international law likely extends
beyond the scope of investor-state arbitration, or even international
adjudication. It possibly identifies something about the nature of
international law in its own right. As noted by a practicing lawyer in the
U.S. State Department prior to the proliferation of international
adjudication:

414

EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 74.
Jan Paulsson, International Arbitration and the Generation of Legal Norms: Treaty Arbitration
and International Law, 5 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. (2006) (noting the beneficial competition for
future acceptance between investor-state awards).
415
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The task of finding ways to work out international disputes tends
also to develop in the Office attorney what might be called a
pragmatic or functional approach to international law—a
tendency to view that law less as a body of fixed and
unchangeable rules than as a flexible tool for use in forging real
solutions to practical problems of international order. Perhaps as
an outgrowth of common-law training, there is a working habit of
viewing new and unique areas of problems on a case-by-case
basis at first, and letting the law work itself out, rather than
jumping immediately into the enunciation of broad principles. In
general, precedent and authority, while important, do not
preclude analysis in terms of sensible result and workable rule.416
Perhaps the common law view can encourage internationalists to see
international law not as a body of rules organized under principles and
axioms, but to focus their attention again on tackling and resolving
problems. On its best of days, international law has lived up to these
aspirations and been a tool for change rather than an impediment to it. To
do so again, it is necessary to shed the constraints of internationalist
formalism evident in the deductive views of international law and embrace
a different, functionalist idea of law. As economic, social, environmental,
and resource problems tend to become increasingly global and increasingly
defy easy categorization in the musty terms of 19th century neo-classical
aphorisms, this change would not come a moment too soon.
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